(A) Limitation Act, 1963 – Section 5 – Limitation – Condonation of delay – Phrase “within such period” signifies that period covered therein extends to not only original period within which, appeal or application, should have been filed, if not for delay, but also period taken in addition to prescribed period of limitation for filing such appeal or application – As such, under Section 5 of Limitation Act, for the purpose of seeking condonation of delay in filing of appeal or application, beyond stipulated period of limitation, delay in filing has to be explained by demonstrating existence of a “sufficient cause” that resulted in such delay for both prescribed period of limitation as well as period after expiry of limitation, up to actual date of filing of such appeal or application, as the case may be – Explanation has to be given for entire duration from the date when clock of limitation began to tick, up until date of actual filing, for seeking condonation of delay by recourse to Section 5 of Limitation Act – Phrase “within such period” must necessarily be construed to refer and encompass both, original prescribed period of limitation as well as period subsequent to its expiry, extending up to actual date of filing of appeal or application – While expression “sufficient cause” and “within such period” are itself inextricably linked together, both these expressions have nothing to do with manner in which court proceeds to condone delay i.e. period which court extends in exercise of its discretion under Section 5 of Limitation Act. (Paras 39, 40, 50, 94 and 101)

(B) Limitation Act, 1963 – Section 3 – Limitation – Law of limitation is founded on public policy – Object of limitation is to put a quietus on stale and dead disputes – A person ought not to be allowed to agitate his claim after a long delay – Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy rights of parties – They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly – Object of providing a legal remedy is to repair damage caused by reason of legal injury – Law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for redress of legal injury so suffered – Unending period for launching remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy – Idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time – Dominant objective underlying law of limitation is that any lis cannot be kept in a state of flux or uncertainty, doubt or suspense – Public interest demands that at some point finality be put to litigation – Sections 4 to 24 of Limitation Act, including Section 5, must be understood in broader framework of law of limitation. (Paras 58, 59, 60, 61 and 70)

(C) Limitation Act, 1963 – Section 5 – Limitation – Condonation of delay – Decisive factor is adequacy of cause shown, not length of delay – Phrase “sufficient cause” in Section 5 of Limitation Act is an expression of elastic import, incapable of precise definition, yet not without boundaries – Its purpose is to empower courts to advance cause of justice by preventing genuine litigants from being shut out on account of unavoidable delays – At the same time, phrase is not a charter for indolence or a device to revive stale claims that law of limitation otherwise extinguishes – Burden to establish sufficient cause lies upon party seeking condonation – Court must be satisfied that cause is real, bona fide, and free of negligence – Sufficiency of cause is to be determined contextually, on totality of circumstances, with due regard to conduct of applicant and prejudice caused to opposite party – Enquiry is not mechanical but principled, resting on dual pillars of bona fides and diligence – Expression “sufficient cause” must be construed in a manner that advances substantial justice while preserving discipline of limitation – Courts are not to be swayed by sympathy or technical rigidity, but rather by a judicious appraisal of whether applicant acted with reasonable diligence in pursuing the remedy – Where explanation is bona fide, plausible, and consistent with ordinary human conduct, courts have leaned towards condonation – Where negligence, want of good faith, or a casual approach is discernible, condonation has been refused. (Paras 123, 124, 127 and 131)

(D) Limitation Act, 1963 – Section 5 – Limitation – Condonation of delay – No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted by courts to misuse process of law – Unlike a private litigant, where State or any of its instrumentalities happens to be litigant in a lis, decision to prefer appeal or file an application is seldom the result of a singular will; rather, it emerges from a collective exercise involving procedural compliance, legal opinion, administrative authorisation and responsible officers bound by rigid protocols and established hierarchies – It was an accepted norm that unavoidable delays would inevitably arise in its litigation, not out of any want of diligence or mala fides, but as a by-product of bureaucratic processes – Unlike in case of private parties, where consequences of dismissal may remain confined to litigants themselves, dismissal of a proceeding initiated by State has a cascading effect, as it directly impacts community whose interests State represents – Adoption of a rigid and uncompromising standard towards State in matters of condonation of delay, would, in substance, punish public for delays that are occasioned by systemic and institutional constraints rather than by deliberate inaction or negligence – Condonation of delay is to remain an exception, not the rule – Governmental litigants, no less than private parties, must demonstrate bona fide, sufficient, and cogent cause for delay – Absent such justification, delay cannot be condoned merely on ground of identity of applicant.(Paras 179, 180, 212 and 264)

(E) Interpretation of Statute – Rule of Statutory Interpretation – While construing a provision, meaningful effect should be given to each and every word used by Legislature within text of the provision – In interpreting a provision, a coherent meaning has to be culled out from entire scheme of the Act and provisions contained therein – Entire text of the provision must be read holistically with entire Act, in toto, and harmoniously integrated with other provisions to preserve internal consistency – Stray lines or words of a provision cannot be isolated or construed in fragments, detached from remaining words and expressions of provision as-well as other provisions within the Statute – In construing or interpreting a provision, any deviation from legislative intent that backs particular statute containing said provision cannot be done casually – Mere omission of few stray words, does not detract or take away lofty intent behind enacting the statute and cannot always be interpreted to impute a contrary intent unless same is apparent and supported by some other salutary object with which such omission may have been made. (Paras 38 and 74)

Facts of the case:

Following questions fall for consideration:

(I) What is meaning and import of expression “within such period” used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act?

(II) When can the exercise of discretion in condoning the delay by a lower court be interfered with by a court in appeal?

(III) Whether the High Court in the present case at hand was justified in condoning the delay?

Findings of Court:

Impugned judgment and order of High Court is hereby set aside. Apart from costs of Rs. 25,000/- imposed by High Court, to be paid by respondent no. 1 to the appellant, we impose an additional cost of Rs. 25,000/- on the respondent no. 1, to be paid to Karnataka State Legal Services Authority within a period of four weeks from today.

Result : Appeal allowed.