State of Chhattisgarh vs Atul Kumar Dewangan - 2026 Supreme(Online)(Chh) 24198

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2026 Supreme(Online)(Chh) 24198

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Ramesh Sinha, CJ, Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J
State of Chhattisgarh – Appellant
Versus
Atul Kumar Dewangan – Respondent
WA No. 770 of 2026

Important Points

The State cannot claim special privilege for condonation of delay based on bureaucratic red tape; 'sufficient cause' requires a bona fide explanation, and the law of limitation applies equally to government bodies to prevent prejudice to private litigants.

Subject

Civil - Limitation/Procedural Law

Act Referred

Limitation Act, 1908: S.5
Constitution of India: Art.227

Headnote

(A) Condonation of Delay - Sufficient Cause - Government Machinery - Bureaucratic red tape and the impersonal machinery of the State cannot be accepted as a plausible explanation for inordinate delay in filing appeals. (Para 5, 9)

(B) Law of Limitation - Equality before Law - The law of limitation binds all litigants equally, including the Government; condonation is an exception and not an anticipated benefit or privilege for State authorities. (Para 5, 7)

(C) Judicial Discretion - Exercise of Power - The discretion to condone delay must be exercised judiciously; negligence, inaction, or lack of bona fides precludes the liberal interpretation of 'sufficient cause'. (Para 6, 10)

Issues: Whether the delay of 506 days in filing the writ appeal by the State could be condoned on the grounds of departmental formalities and government machinery.

Advocates:
For the Appellants/Petitioners: Prasun Bhaduri
For the Respondents: C. Jayant K. Rao

Table of Content
1. state's plea for condonation of 506 days delay based on departmental formalities. (Para 1 , 2 , 3)
2. government machinery and bureaucratic red tape are not valid grounds for condoning inordinate delay. (Para 4 , 5)
3. accountability and penalization of officials for causing revenue loss through procedural lapses. (Para 6)
4. limitation laws apply equally to state and private parties to prevent state laxity. (Para 7 , 8)
5. dismissal of appeal due to failure to demonstrate sufficient cause for extraordinary delay. (Para 9 , 10 , 11)

Judgment on Board

Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice

1. Heard Mr. Prasun Bhaduri, learned Deputy Advocate General, appearing for the State/appellants, as well as Mr. C. Jayant K. Rao, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, on I.A. No. 1 of 2026, which is an application for condonation of delay.

2. Learned Deputy Advocate General, appearing for the State/appellants, submits that the learned Single Judge passed the impugned order on 13.01.2025 in WPS No. 227 of 2026. Thereafter, for preferring the present appeal, permission was granted by the Department of Law and Legislative Affairs, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Nava Raipur, Atal Nagar, District Raipur, vide order dated 26.05.2026. The Department concerned thereafter appointed the Officer-in-Charge for filing the instant Writ Appeal on behalf of the appellants/State vide order dated 16.06.2026. Subsequently, the matter was placed before the learned Advocate General on 01.07.2026 and, on the same day, the case was marked to the learned Deputy Government Advocate for drafting the Writ Appeal against the impugned judgment and order dated 13.01.2025.

3. It has been contended that, after obtaining the necessary documents and information in respect of the case, the State was required to comply with various departmental formalities, which resulted in the delay owing to the functioning of the Government machinery. It is submitted that the State Government is a multi-functional body and, at times, the completion of departmental formalities takes an unexpectedly long time. Consequently, in certain cases, the State is prevented from instituting proceedings within the prescribed period of limitation, despite the delay being bona fide and neither deliberate nor intentional. In the instant case, there has been a delay of 506 days beyond the prescribed period of limitation in preferring the appeal. Reliance has been placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani , reported in (1996) 3 SCC 132, in support of the aforesaid submissions. Learned State counsel, therefore, prays that the delay of 506 days in preferring the appeal may kindly be condoned.

4. The question for determination before this Court is whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (i.e. Act 9 of 1908 i.e. the old Limitation Act) would apply to an application for condonation of delay.

5. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Postmaster General and others v. Living Media India Limited and another , reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563, has dealt with the limitation issue and held as under:-

“27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.

28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice,