2026 Supreme(Online)(Chh) 25281
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Ramesh Sinha, CJ, Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J
State of Chhattisgarh – Appellant
Versus
Kamalesh Kumar Verma – Respondent
WA No. 682 of 2026
Important Points
Subject
Civil - Limitation
Act Referred
Headnote
(B) Discretionary Power - Exercise of Power - Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments; discretion must be exercised judiciously based on bona fides and diligence. (Para 7, 11)
Issues: Whether the delay of 78 days in filing the writ appeal could be condoned on the grounds of departmental formalities and government machinery functioning.
For the Appellants/Petitioners: Prasun Bhaduri
For the Respondents: Arpan Verma
Judgment on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice
1. Heard Mr. Prasun Bhaduri, learned Deputy Advocate General, appearing for the State/appellants, as well as Mr. Arpan Verma, learned counsel, appearing for the respondent on I.A. No. 1 of 2026, which is an application for condonation of delay.
2. Learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for the State/appellants submits that the learned Single Judge passed the impugned order on 26.02.2026 in WPS No. 11266 of 2025. Thereafter, appellants/State authorities through the concerned Department had sought an opinion from the office of the Advocate General vide letter dated 23.04.2026. Pursuant thereto, the Office of the Advocate General, vide its letter dated 15.05.2026, accorded opinion for filing the appeal. Subsequently, a proposal was forwarded to the Law and Legislative Affairs Department through the concerned Department for grant of sanction and accordingly, sanction for filing the appeal was granted on 16.06.2026. Thereafter, the Officer-in-Charge (OIC) was appointed by the concerned Department, and the present appeal has thereafter been drafted and filed before this Hon’ble Court.
3. It has been contended that the State, after obtaining necessary documents and information with respect to the case, faced delay due to compliance with various departmental formalities and the functioning of Government machinery, as the State Government is a multi-functional body and, at times, completion of departmental formalities takes unexpectedly long time. Therefore, in certain cases, the State is prevented from filing proceedings within the prescribed period of limitation, which is bona fide and not deliberate. The instant appeal has, therefore, been filed with a delay of 78 days beyond the prescribed period of limitation. Accordingly, learned State counsel prays that the delay of 78 days in preferring the appeal may be condoned.
4. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that, in identical matters, this Bench has dismissed WA No. 165 of 2026, State of Chhattisgarh & Others v. Karunesh Meshram, WA No. 183 of 2026, State of Chhattisgarh & Others v. Vikas Kumar Choubey, and WA No. 676 of 2026, State of Chhattisgarh & Others v. C.K. Patle, by orders dated 19.02.2026, 27.02.2026, and 07.08.2026, respectively, on the ground of delay. It is, therefore, contended that the present appeal also deserves to be dismissed on the same ground.
5. The question for determination before this Court is whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (i.e. Act 9 of 1908 i.e. the old Limitation Act) would apply to an application for condonation of delay.
6. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Postmaster General and others v. Living Media India Limited and another , reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563, has dealt with the limitation issue and held as under:-
“27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies be