Criminal and civil proceedings are legally independent, even when stemming from the same incident. Acquittal in a criminal proceeding due to a failure to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt does not bar or invalidate civil proceedings, which require a lower standard of proof based on the preponderance of evidence.

JUDGMENT :

PRATEEK JALAN, J.

1. By way of this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioners challenge an order of the learned Mahila Court dated 13.02.2026, by which the court has declined to dispose of the proceedings initiated by the respondent herein against the petitioners, under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 [“DV Act”]. The petitioners also seek quashing of the proceedings under the DV Act. The application was predicated on the ground that the petitioners have been acquitted in criminal proceedings based on substantially similar allegations.

2. The factual background of the case is as follows:

A. Petitioner No. 1 is the husband of the respondent, and the other two petitioners are his parents.

B. The marriage of petitioner No. 1 and the respondent was solemnised on 08.02.2012.

C. The respondent instituted the subject complaint under the DV Act on 14.01.2016.

D. The respondent made a complaint before the Crime Against Women [“CAW”] Cell on 02.11.2015, which came to be registered as FIR No. 40/2016 dated 28.01.2016 at P.S. Palam Village, District South West, Delhi, under Sections 498A/406/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 [“IPC”].

E. On 26.11.2024, the petitioners were acquitted in the criminal proceedings. The Trial Court recorded the conclusion that the deposition of the complainant [respondent herein] failed to prove the allegations against the accused persons [petitioners herein] beyond reasonable doubt.

F. On the basis of the said judgment acquitting the petitioners, petitioner No. 1 filed the application dated 16.01.2026 before the Mahila Court, seeking disposal of the DV Act proceedings. He also submitted that the allegations in the DV Act complaint were vague, generic, and omnibus and have been disbelieved, as recorded in the judgment dated 26.11.2024. He therefore prayed that the petitioners may not be put through a second proceeding on the same allegations.

G. In the impugned order dated 13.02.2026, the Mahila Court dismissed the petitioners’ application, holding that both proceedings were independent and could coexist. Further, it was held that the acquittal in criminal proceedings did not preclude an aggrieved person from seeking civil remedies under the DV Act.

3. Mr. Zeeshan Diwan, learned counsel for the petitioners, submits that both the proceedings arise out of substantially similar allegations. In fact, he submits that the substantive allegations in the FIR and the proceedings under the DV Act are verbatim reproductions of each other. Mr. Diwan draws my attention to the factual findings of the learned Trial Court in the judgment of acquittal,[Paragraph 27 of the judgment dated 26.11.2024 of the JMFC, Mahila Court-02, South West, Dwarka Courts, Delhi, in CR Case No. 1881/2017], to contend that a second round of proceedings would be harassive to the petitioners, vexatious, and amount to an abuse of the process of Court.

4. Mr. Diwan cites the judgment of the Supreme Court in Kailashben Mahendrabhai Patel & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2621, [hereinafter, “Kailashben”]., and the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Narayan Biswas & Ors. v. State of West Bengal & Anr., 2024 SCC OnLine Cal 1926, [hereinafter, “Narayan Biswas”]., in support of his contentions. He also draws my attention to the judgment of a coordinate Bench of this Court in Abhishek Kumar v. Neha Lal , 2024 S