ORDER

1. By way of this application, challenge has been given to the order dated 07.04.2026 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Court No.13, City Civil and Sessions Court, Ahmedabad below Exhibit 8 in Criminal Appeal No.100 of 2026 whereby a prayer was made to consider the provision of Section 357(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (referred to in short as ‘Cr.P.C.’) and to give concession to the applicant in connection with the order dated 02.02.2025 in the Criminal Appeal by the learned Sessions Judge below Exhibits 4 and 5.

2. Learned advocate for the applicant Mr. Rushabh R. Jain has submitted that the impugned order has made reference that the leave of defence and the copy of the order of the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court has not been produced. Learned advocate further submitted that the learned Judge was required to call for the documents from the applicant for consideration instead of rejecting the application. It is also submitted that the provision under Section 357 has to be followed as provided under Section 143A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (in short the ‘N.I. Act’), where the learned Magistrate while making the order for paying the interim compensation to the complainant would be required to follow the provision of Section 357 of the Cr.P.C. It is therefore, submitted that the learned Appellate Court has erred in law by passing the above order, whereby the Appellate Court was required to keep in mind that any order of deposit of compensation money would be in consonance to the provision of Section 357 of Cr.P.C. whereby sub-section (5) should be given due importance.

3. To substantiate his arguments, learned advocate Mr. Rushabh R. Jain has relied on the decision dated 01.11.2025 of the High Court of Delhi in the case of Mohd Umar v. State of NCT of Delhi & Another in Criminal Appeal No.90 of 2025 to submit that the Appellate Court had failed to consider the money deposited in the Summary Suit between the parties.

4. In the case of Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava v. State of Jharkhand and Others reported in 2024 (4) SCC 419 the Apex Court had dealt with the power of the appellate Court under Section 148 of the N.I. Act vis-a-viz the power under Section 143A whereby the Court had made observations with reference to the case of Surinder Singh Deswal v. Virender Gandhi reported in 2019 (11) SCC 341. Paragraph 20 of the said decision reads as under :-

“20. Even sub-section (1) of Section 148 uses the word “may”. In the case of Surinder Singh Deswal v. Virender Gandhi reported in (2019) 11 SCC 341, this Court, after considering the provisions of Section 148, held that the word “may” used therein will have to be generally construed as “rule” or “shall”. It was further observed that when the Appellate Court decides not to direct the deposit by the accused, it must record the reasons. After considering the said decision in the case of Surinder Singh Deswal, this Court, in the case of Jamboo Bhandari v. Madhya Pradesh State Industrial Development Corporation Limited & Ors., in paragraph 6, held thus:

“6. What is held by this Court is that a purposive interpretation should be made of Section 148 NI Act. Hence, normally, the appellate court will be justified in imposing the condition of deposit as provided in Section 148. However, in a case where the appellate court is satisfied that the condition of deposit of 20% will be unjust or imposing such a condition will amount to deprivation of the right of appeal of the appellant, exception can be made for the reasons specifically recorded.” (Emphasis added)

5. In the said decision of Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava (supra), the Apex Court had concluded by summarizing the effect of provision of Section 143A as under :-

“27. Subject to what is held earlier, the main conclusions can be summarised as follows :

27.1. The exercise of power under sub-section (1) of Section 143A is discretionary. The provision is directory and not man