Writ petitions under Article 226 are not maintainable for purely contractual disputes; such matters should be resolved in civil courts unless public law elements are involved.

JUDGMENT

Anil K. Narendran, J.

The petitioner has filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking a writ of certiorari to quash Ext.P17 communication dated 15.03.2025 issued by the 3^rd respondent Executive Officer, Sabarimala Devaswom; a declaration that respondents 1 to 3 are not entitled to forfeit the amounts payable to the petitioner towards the alleged dues of S.S.A. Enterprises; and a writ of mandamus commanding respondents 1 to 3 to pay the petitioner the amounts legally payable by them, as discernible from Ext.P21 statement of accounts.

2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and also the learned Standing Counsel for Travancore Devaswom Board for respondents 1 to 3.

3. On the question of maintainability of this writ petition, the learned Standing Counsel for Travancore Devaswom Board would point out the law laid down in the decision of this Court in SITCO Associates v. State of Kerala [ 2023 (6) KHC SN 5 ]

4. In State of Bihar v. Jain Plastics and Chemicals Ltd. [ (2002) 1 SCC 216 ] the Apex Court reiterated that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not the proper procedure for adjudicating disputes relating to the enforcement of contractual obligations. Under the law, it was open to the respondent to approach the court of competent jurisdiction for appropriate relief for breach of contract. It is settled law that when an alternative and equally efficacious remedy is open to the litigant, he should be required to pursue that remedy and not invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. Equally, the existence of an alternative remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of the court to issue a writ, but ordinarily, that would be a good ground for refusing to exercise the discretion under Article 226. It is true that many matters could be decided after referring to the contentions raised in the affidavits and counter-affidavits, but that would hardly be a ground for the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in case of an alleged breach of contract. Whether the alleged non-supply of road permits by the appellants would justify a breach of contract by the respondent would depend upon facts and evidence and is not required to be decided or dealt with in a writ petition. Such seriously disputed questions or rival claims of the parties with regard to breach of contract are to be investigated and determined on the basis of evidence which may be led by the parties in a properly instituted civil suit rather than by a court exercising the prerogative of issuing writs.

5. InNational Highways Authority of India v. Ganga Enterprises [ (2003) 7 SCC 410 ] the Apex Court was dealing with a case in which the respondent had filed a writ petition before the High Court for refund of the amount. The High Court posed two questions, namely, (a) whether the forfeiture of the security deposit is without the authority of law and without any binding contract between the parties and also contrary to Section 5 of the Contract Act; and (b) whether the writ petition is maintainable in a claim arising out of breach of contract. While dealing with the said issue the Apex Court opined that it is settled law that disputes relating to contracts cannot be agitated under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It has been so held inKerala State Electricity Board v. Kurien E. Kalathil [(2000) 6 SCC 293], State of U.P. v. Bridge and Roof Company (India) Ltd. [(1996) 6 SCC 22] and Bareilly Development Authority v. Ajai Pal Singh [ (1989) 2 SCC 116 ]. This is settled law. The dispute in the case before the Apex Court was regarding the terms of an offer. They were thus contractual disputes in respect of which a writ court was not the proper forum. The Senior Counsel for the respondent relied upon the decisions inVerigamto Naveen v. State of A.P. [(2001) 8 SCC 344] and Harminder Singh Arora v. Union of India [(1986) 3 SCC 247]. The Apex Court noticed that th