The authority to prescribe and modify timing schedules for stage carriages lies with the transport authority under the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, and objections from other operators must be considered.

JUDGMENT

P .G.Ajithkumar, J.

The petitioner in W.P.(C) No.35827 of 2024 is the appellant. The following reliefs were claimed in the writ petition:

“(i) Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ or order restraining the 1st respondent from revising the existing timings of the petitioner's service on the strength of Ext.P6 notice if there are no orders from any competent court for revising the timings of the petitioner's service;

(ii) Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ or order restraining the 1st respondent from interfering with the existing timing schedule of the petitioner's service against the provisions stipulated under Section 212 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules.”

2. The learned Single Judge as per the judgment dated 16.10.2024 disposed of the said writ petition in the following terms:

“The present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed impugning Ext.P6 notice issued by the respondents for holding timing conference and taking up the application for violation of permit/timing for the operation of stage carriages.

2. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the timing for stage carriage operation having registration No. KL 55 3319 was settled in compliance with the judgment passed by this Court on 05.06.2024 in W.P.(C) No.19079/2024, and therefore, there is no revision of timing takes place.

3. The timing conference has been scheduled on 18.10.2024, and no decision has yet to be taken. If the petitioner has any grievance against the proposed timing for the operation of stage carriage KL 55 3319, the petitioner may file his objection, which shall be considered by the 1st respondent Authority along with any other objections and take decision in accordance with law.

With the above directions, the present writ petition stands disposed of.”

3. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the Senior Government Pleader.

4. The learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the learned Single Judge without affording an opportunity of being heard disposed of the writ petition. Had the appellant been given an opportunity to substantiate his plea, such a judgment would not have been rendered. It is submitted that a holder of permit, has no right to challenge the appellant’s permit or to question the timings. Going by Rule 212 of the Kerala Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989, no rival bus operators have a right to question the schedule of timing in respect of the stage carriage of the appellant. Even when changes are ordered in the timings of a service, that would never affect a permit which is already issued. In that view of the matter, it is urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that the learned Single Judge ought to have restrained the timing conference, instead of given a direction to consider the objection that may be put in by the appellant. Further submission is that when statutory remedy of revision under Section 90 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 was available to the aggrieved persons, Ext.P6 notice should have been held illegal.

5. A timing conference was scheduled for 18.10.2024.

What the learned Single Judge did is only giving a direction to the 1st respondent to consider the objection that may be put in by the appellant along with the objections submitted by others in the timing conference.

6. The case of the appellant is that having settled timing for his stage carriage as per Ext.P4, there was no reason or rhyme for the 1st respondent to consider the objection of others, who are existing operators. We are unable to accept the said contention readily. The 1st respondent is empowered under Rule 212 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules to prescribe schedule of timing for each stage carriage and power to bring about change to the schedule of timing comes within that fold. Hence, the timing conference scheduled by the 1st respondent cannot be said to be without any authority. Considering the relief granted, we find no justification to interfere with