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2023 Supreme(Online)(KER) 5982
HIGH COURT OF KERALA
Sathish Ninan, J
PAMELLA D CRUZ – Appellant
Versus
LEELAMMA ALOSIOUS – Respondent
OP(C) 1705/2014
SRI.K.B.PRADEEP, SRI.ASHOK SURESH, SRI.GOVIND PADMANAABHAN, SRI.MANU, SRI.RAM MOHAN.G., SRI.G.P.SHINOD
A Lok Adalat award acts as a civil decree, requiring challenges to be made in accordance with specific procedural rules under the CPC.
Headnote:
Legal Services - Original Petition - Legal Services Authorities Act 1987, Section 21 - The court deemed the Lok Adalat award as a civil decree, emphasizing that challenges to consent decrees must adhere to CPC provisions, validating the trial court's role in adjudicating claims of fraud in compromises.
Fact of the Case:
The plaintiffs contested a Lok Adalat award reached through a power of attorney, alleging fraud in the compromise process. They sought to challenge the settlement document, resulting in an Original Petition.
Finding of the Court:
The court determined that the Original Petition was not maintainable as the award from the Lok Adalat was deemed a civil decree. The petitioners were required to follow specific procedural recourse for challenging the compromise in the trial court.
Issues: The key issue was whether the Original Petition was maintainable against a Lok Adalat award based on allegations of fraud.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that challenges to a Lok Adalat award, viewed as a civil decree, must be pursued under Order 23 Rule 3 CPC, specifically addressing the need for adequate evidence and proper procedure.
Final Decision: The Original Petition is dismissed, with the trial court instructed to consider the petitioners' application on its merits.
JUDGMENT
The suit for declaration of title, mandatory injunction, and for setting aside a document, was settled before the Adalat. The plaintiffs were being represented by a power of attorney holder. The compromise was entered into through the power of attorney holder. Ext.P2 is the terms of settlement and Ext.P3 is the Award. As per the compromise, the suit was “closed”.
2. Through another power of attorney, the plaintiffs in the suit have filed this Original Petition challenging the compromise, alleging fraud on the part of the power of attorney holder who entered into the compromise.
3. Heard Sri.K.B.Pradeep – learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri.G.P.Shinod – learned counsel for the respondent.
4. The respondent raised a preliminary objection with regard to the maintainability of the Original Petition. The issue regarding the maintainability is thus being considered.
5. Section 21 of the Legal Services Authorities Act , 1987 reads thus:- “21. Award of Lok Adalat.⸺(1) Every award of the Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a decree of a civil court or, as the case may be, an order of any other court and where a compromise or settlement has been arrived at, by a Lok Adalat in a case referred to it under sub-section (1) of section 20, the court-free paid in such case shall be refunded in the manner provided under the Court Fees Act, 1870 (7 of 1870).”
6. In terms thereof, the Award passed by the Adalat is deemed to be a decree passed by the Civil Court. Therefore, Ext.P3 Award with Ext.P2 terms thereto, is deemed to be a decree passed by the Court – the Subordinate Judge Court, Thiruvananthapuram. In Thomas v. Thomas Job [2005 (6) SCC 478], the Apex Court held that, the Award passed by the Lok Adalat is fictionally a deemed decree of the Court, and that the Courts have all the powers in relation thereto, as if, is a decree passed by itself.
7. Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads thus:
“3. Compromise of suit.- Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise [in writing and signed by the parties], or where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject- matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to the recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith [so far as it relates to the parties to be suit, whether or not the subject-matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject - matter of the suit];
[Provided that where it is alleged by one party and denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, the Court shall decided the question; but no adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of deciding the question, unless the Court, for reasons to the recorded, thinks fit to grant such adjournment.]
[Explanation.- An agreement or compromise which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of this rule.]”
8. In terms thereof, a challenge against a consent decree based on compromise, is to be made in terms of the proviso to Rule 3.
9. In Triloki Nath Singh v. Anirudh Singh (D) Thr.LRs and Others [2020 (6) SCC 629] , the Apex Court held that the remedy available to a party to a consent/ compromise decree to avoid the decree is, to approach the Court which recorded the compromise and made a decree in terms of it, and establish that there was no compromise. To the same effect are the judgments inBanwari Lal v. Smt.Chando Devi (through L.R) and Another [1993 (1) SCC 581] and in Janakiammal R. and Others v. S.K.Kumarasamy (deceased) through legal representatives and Others [2021 (9) SCC 114].
10. The learned counsel for the petitioners drew the attention of this Court to the decision of the Apex Court in State of Punjab v. Jalour Singh [AIR 2008 SC 1209] to contend that, an Original Petition under Article 227 of the
