A charge sheet is considered valid evidence of negligence for claims, impacting the assessment of damages significantly.

JUDGMENT

The award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Kozhikode in O.P(MV)No.687 of 2011 has been assailed by both the claimant, as also, the 3rd respondent Insurance Company. MACA No.248 of 2015 is the appeal preferred by the 3rd respondent Insurance Company, while MACA No.2810 of 2014 is the one preferred by the claimant.

2. The accident occurred on 08.05.2010, when the claimant was traveling in a motorcycle, which collided with a lorry, resulting in serious injuries.

3. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant in MACA No.2810 of 2014 (the claimant) and the learned counsel for the appellant in MACA No.248 of 2015 (3rd respondent Insurance Company). Perused the records.

4. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant in MACA No.248 of 2015 preferred by the Insurance Company assailed the award on the following counts. First of all, learned counsel submitted that the Tribunal ought to have found contributory negligence on the part of the driver/claimant, in as much as, no charge sheet in respect of the crime registered in connection with the accident was produced before the Tribunal. It was also submitted that the Tribunal went seriously wrong in finding negligence against the driver of the offending vehicle in the absence of a charge sheet, but relying upon the FIR.

5. Faced with the situation, the learned counsel for the claimant (appellant in MACA No.2810 of 2014) produced the charge sheet before this Court, a copy of which has been served upon the learned Senior Counsel for the Insurance Company, wherein, the driver of the offending vehicle has been found as the accused, who according to the Investigating Officer, drove the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner. Going by the judgment inNew India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Pazhani Ammal [ 2011(3) KLT 648 ], a charge sheet is prima facie sufficient proof of negligence for the purpose of a claim under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act . Therefore, the said contention of the Insurance Company is rejected in the light of the additional evidence produced. Copy of the charge sheet is marked as Ext.A11.

6. The second count canvased by the learned counsel for the Insurance Company is with respect to the disability reckoned by the Tribunal. It was pointed out that 60% reckoned was very much on the higher side. This submission was seriously opposed by the learned counsel for the claimant. It was emphasised that the claimant was a student of Mechanical Engineering, aged 19 years at the time of accident and the disability has been reckoned based on the fact that his right hand is fully paralyzed, as discernible from Ext.C1 report. Having regard to the particular trade of Engineering, which the claimant was pursuing, fixing the disability at 60% is quite proper, according to the learned counsel for the claimant.

7. Having heard the learned counsel appearing on both sides, this Court is inclined to endorse the submissions made by the learned counsel for the claimant. As rightly pointed out, the claimant was a student aged 19 years, pursuing Mechanical Engineering Course at the time of accident. Loss of his right hand, in as much as it is fully paralyzed, would certainly affect his job prospects significantly, especially having regard to the fact that he was pursuing Mechanical Engineering. The disability reckoned by the Board vide Ext.C1 was 87%, whereas, the functional disability access by the Tribunal was 60%. This Court is of the opinion that the functional disability has been correctly assessed by the Tribunal, which warrants no interference.

8. The 3rd count canvased by the learned counsel is with respect to the notional income of the claimant reckoned by the Tribunal. The Tribunal reckoned an annual income of Rs.1 lakh, which according to the learned counsel for the Insurance Company is on the higher side. In support of that proposition, the learned counsel relied upon the judgment inMeena Pawaia & others v. Ashraf Ali & others [ 2021 (6) KHC 596 ], wherein, the Hon'ble Supreme Court h