Detention under preventive laws can validly occur even if the detenu is in judicial custody, subject to specific conditions being satisfied.

J U D G M E N T

Jobin Sebastian, J.

The petitioner herein is the wife of one Sreejith ('detenu' for the sake of brevity) and her challenge in this Writ Petition is directed against Ext.P1 order of detention dated 31.07.2025 passed by the 2nd respondent under Section 3 (1) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 (‘KAA(P) Act’ for brevity). After considering the opinion of the Advisory Board, the Government confirmed the detention order vide order dated 26.09.2025, and the detenu has been ordered to be detained for a period of six months, from the date of detention.

2. The records reveal that, on 10.07.2025, a proposal was submitted by the District Police Chief, Thiruvananthapuram Rural, seeking initiation of proceedings against the detenu under the KAA(P) Act before the jurisdictional authority, the 2nd respondent. For the purpose of initiation of the said proceedings, the detenu was classified as a 'known rowdy' as defined under Section 2 (p)(iii) of the KAA(P) Act.

3. Altogether, four cases in which the detenu was involved have been considered by the jurisdictional authority for passing the order of detention. Out of the said cases considered, the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity is crime No.592/2025 of Kallambalam Police Station, alleging commission of offences punishable under Sections 3 41, 118(1), 118(2), 61(2) r/w 3(5) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (for short “BNS”) and Section 3 (2)(v) of SC/ST POA Act.

4. We heard Sri. Rajesh Narayan L., the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, and Sri. K.A. Anas, the learned Public Prosecutor.

5. Relying on the decision in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India and another, [1991 (1) SCC 128] , the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that in cases wherein the detenu is in judicial custody, in connection with the last prejudicial activity, a detention order under preventive detention laws can be validly passed only on satisfaction of the triple test mentioned in the said decision by the Supreme Court. According to the counsel, as the impugned order was passed while the detenu was in judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity, it was incumbent upon the authority to satisfy itself that it has reason to believe, on the basis of reliable material placed before it that, there is a real possibility of the detenu being released on bail and that on being so released he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activity. According to the counsel, though in Ext.P1 order, it is mentioned that the detenu was undergoing judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity, it is nowhere mentioned that there is a real possibility of the detenu being released on bail in connection with the last prejudicial activity. The learned Counsel further urged that there is an inordinate delay in mooting the proposal as well as passing the detention order, and hence, the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of detention is snapped. On these premises, the learned counsel submitted that the impugned order is liable to be set aside.

6. In response, the learned Public Prosecutor submitted that Ext.P1 order of detention was passed by the jurisdictional authority after proper application of mind and upon arriving at the requisite objective as well as subjective satisfaction. According to the Public Prosecutor, the impugned order of detention was passed by the jurisdictional authority after being satisfied that a detention order under Section 3 (1) of