Detention orders under preventive laws require evidence of imminent release and likelihood of further criminal activity for individuals in custody.

Jobin Sebastian, J.

This writ petition has been directed against an order of detention dated 23.08.2025, passed against one Ibrahim Khaleel C. M. (herein after referred to as ‘detenu’) under Section 3 (1) of the Kerala Anti- Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 (‘KAA(P) Act’ for brevity). The petitioner herein is the wife of the detenu. The detention order stands confirmed by the Government vide order dated 01.11.2025, and the detenu has been ordered to be detained for a period of six months from the date of execution of the order.

2. The records available before us disclose that, on 10.07.2025, a proposal was submitted by the District Police Chief, Kasaragod, seeking initiation of proceedings under Section 3 (1) of the KAA(P) Act before the jurisdictional authority. For the purpose of initiation of the said proceedings, the detenu was classified as a 'known rowdy' as defined under Section 2 (p)(iii) of the KAA(P) Act. For passing the order of detention, the authority reckoned ten cases in which the detenu got involved. The case registered against the detenu with respect to the last prejudicial activity is crime No.686/2025 of Payyanur Police Station, alleging commission of an offence punishable under 09(4) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita ( BNS ).

3. We have heard Smt. Reeha Khaderk, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, and Sri.K.A.Anas, the learned Government Pleader.

4. Relying on the decision in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India and another , [1991 (1) SCC 128] , the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that in cases wherein the detenu is in judicial custody, in connection with the last prejudicial activity, a detention order under preventive detention laws can be validly passed only on satisfaction of the triple test mentioned in the said decision by the Supreme Court. According to the counsel, as the impugned order was passed while the detenu was in judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity, it was incumbent upon the authority to satisfy itself that it has reason to believe, on the basis of reliable material placed before it that, there is a real possibility of the detenu being released on bail and that on being so released he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activity. According to the counsel, though in the Ext.P1 order, it is mentioned that the detenu was undergoing judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity, it is nowhere mentioned that there is a real possibility of the detenu being released on bail in connection with the last prejudicial activity, and if so released, he would be involved in criminal activities again.

5. In response, the learned Public Prosecutor submitted that Ext.P1 order of detention was passed by the jurisdictional authority after complying with all the procedural formalities and after arriving at the requisite objective as well as subjective satisfaction. According to the Public Prosecutor, the impugned order of detention was passed by the jurisdictional authority after being satisfied that a detention order under Section 3 (1) of the KAA(P) Act is the only remedy to deter the detenu from repeating criminal activities. It was further contended that the jurisdictional authority was fully aware of the fact that the detenu was in judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity at the time when the detention order was passed and therefore, the detention order will legally sustain irrespective of the fact that the detenu was under judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity while the impugned order was passed.

6. From the rival contentions raised, it is gatherable that the main question that revolves