An aggrieved party must exhaust statutory remedies under the SARFAESI Act before invoking the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226.

Anil K. Narendran, J.

The appellants filed W.P.(C)No.29696 of 2025 under Article

226 of the Constitution of India, seeking a writ of mandamus restraining the respondent Bank from proceeding further against the property of the 1^st appellant having an extent of 20.75 Ares in Re.Sy.No.69/14 in Aluva East Village of Aluva Taluk in Ernakulam District and described in the schedule to sale deed No.2509/1990 of Aluva Sub Registrar Office on the basis of Ext.P3 notice dated 01.08.2025 and a writ of mandamus commanding the respondent Bank and the Advocate Commissioner not to initiate coercive steps such as taking possession of the petrol bunk, namely, Moly and Boban Agencies on the basis of Ext.P3 notice. By the judgment dated 17.12.2025, the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition, without prejudice to the right of the petitioners to raise the contentions in the writ petition as well as other available contentions before the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act or in the original application pending before the Debts Recovery Tribunal-I, Ernakulam.

2. Heard arguments of the learned counsel for the appellants-petitioners and also the learned counsel for the respondent Bank.

3. The issue that requires consideration in this writ appeal is as to whether any interference is warranted on the judgment dated 17.12.2025 of the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C)No.29696 of 2025, whereby that writ petition stands dismissed for the reasons stated therein.

4. In United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon [ (2010) 8 SCC 110 ], a Two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court held that if the 1^st respondent guarantor had any tangible grievance against the notice issued under Section 13 (4) of the SARFAESI Act or the action taken under Section 14 , then he could have availed remedy by filing an application under Section 17 (1) before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. The expression ‘any person’ used in Section 17 (1) is of wide import. It takes within its fold, not only the borrower but also the guarantor or any other person who may be affected by the action taken under Section 13 (4) or Section 14 . Both, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are empowered to pass interim orders under Sections 17 and 18 and are required to decide the matters within a fixed time schedule. It is thus evident that the remedies available to an aggrieved person under the SARFAESI Act are both expeditious and effective.

5. In Satyawati Tondon [ (2010) 8 SCC 110 ], on the facts of the case at hand, the Apex Court noted that the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. While dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves, inasmuch as, they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute.

6. In South Indian Bank Ltd. v. Naveen Mathew Philip [ (2023) 17 SCC 311 ], in the context of the challenge made against the notices issued under Section