Detention valid during custody if authority satisfies triple test: custody awareness, bail likelihood, and preventive necessity.

This writ petition is directed against an order of detention dated

29.11.2025 passed against one Muhammed Habeeb Rahman (herein after referred to as 'detenu'), under Section 3 (1) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 (‘KAA(P) Act’ for brevity). The petitioner herein is the mother of the detenu. After considering the opinion of the Advisory Board, the said order stands confirmed by the Government vide order dated 28.01.2026, and the detenu has been ordered to be detained for a period of six months with effect from the date of detention.

2. The records reveal that on 12.11.2025, a proposal was submitted by the District Police Chief, Thiruvananthapuram Rural, seeking initiation of proceedings against the detenu under the KAA(P) Act before the jurisdictional authority, the 2nd respondent. For the purpose of initiation of the said proceedings, the detenu was classified as a 'known rowdy' as defined under Section 2 (p)(iii) of the KAA(P) Act.

3. Altogether, nine cases in which the detenu got involved have been considered by the jurisdictional authority for passing Ext.P1 detention order. Out of the said cases, the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity is crime No.990/2025 of Vilappilsala Police Station, alleging commission of the offences punishable under Sections 296(b), 126(2), 115(2), 118(1), 109 r/w 3(5) of BNS.

4. We heard Smt. Shyni Das J.S., the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, and Sri. K. A. Anas, the learned Government Pleader.

5. The learned counsel for the petitioner, relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India [ 1991 (1) SCC 128 ], contends that when a detenu is already in judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity, a detention order under preventive detention laws can be validly issued only if the authority satisfies the triple test laid down in the said judgment. According to the counsel, since the impugned order was passed while the detenu was in judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity, the detaining authority was required to satisfy itself, on the basis of reliable material placed before it, that there existed a real possibility of the detenu being released on bail and that, upon such release, he would in all probability engage in prejudicial activities. The counsel further contends that although Ext.P1 order records that the detenu was in judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity, the question of the likelihood of the detenu being released on bail has not been properly considered. It was further submitted that while passing Ext.P1 order, the jurisdictional authority failed to take note of the fact that there was a time gap of more than one year between the last prejudicial activity and the last but one case registered against the detenu, and the said time gap itself would show that the detenu is not a person having the propensity to be involved in criminal activities repeatedly. On these premises, it was urged that the detention order is liable to be set aside.

6. In response, the learned Government Pleader submitted that Ext.P1 detention order was passed by the jurisdictional authority after proper application of mind and upon arriving at the requisite objective as well as subjective satisfaction. According to the learned Government Pleader, the detention order was passed by the competent authority upon being fully satisfied that such detention was the only effective means to prevent the detenu from repeating criminal activities. It was further contended that the authority was fully aware of the fact that the detenu