Key Points: - Non-furnishing of grounds of arrest does not automatically invalidate arrest; prejudice must be shown (!) (!) - Article 22(1) rights and the requirement for informing grounds are satisfied by substantial compliance; written grounds are not mandatory in all cases (!) (!) - For NDPS Act Section 37 bail, harsh criteria require belief of not guilty and not likely to commit offences; procedural lapses are weighed against gravity of offense (!) - Courts distinguish between grounds of arrest and arrest memo; absence of grounds is a procedural lapse with potential prejudice unless demonstrated (!) (!) - Precedent shows the lapse may be ignored where accused had awareness or where no prejudice is shown; recent judgments emphasize prejudice-centric testing (!) (!) - Mihir Rajesh Shah’s case (06.11.2025) prospectively applied; arrests before that date may not benefit from written grounds obligation if no prejudice (!) (!) - Pankaj Bansal (03.10.2023) established grounds of arrest informs defense; subsequent Supreme Court clarifications affect its retroactivity (!) (!) (!) - The court emphasizes that arrests prior to Mihir Rajesh Shah and in flagrante delicto may not gain bail relief solely due to lack of written grounds (!) - Grounds of arrest aim to enable defense, counsel access, and bail challenges; the procedure must balance constitutional safeguards with law enforcement efficiency (!) (!) - Petitions are dismissed for lack of demonstrable prejudice and inability to satisfy Section 37(1)(b)(ii) NDPS criteria (!)

What is the relevance of non-furnishing grounds of arrest to the legality of arrest and bail?

What is the standard to determine prejudice from procedural lapses in furnishing grounds of arrest?

What is the effect of subsequent Supreme Court judgments (e.g., Mihir Rajesh Shah) on prior arrests or bail petitions in light of timing?