Heard on the application seeking condonation of delay of 1133 days in filing the writ appeal, which assails the order dated 19.09.2022 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.11670 of 2006.

2. In the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, it is stated that the delay occurred due to change of administration and transfer of the 3^rd appellant and that unfortunately the papers were tied with other bundles and therefore could not be traced immediately, which has caused the delay.

3. The issue relating to condonation of delay is no longer res integra, and the Supreme Court has settled the legal position through a catena of decisions, of which relevant paragraphs of a few decisions are reproduced hereunder:

(i) In Karnataka Power Corporation Ltd. V. K. Thangappan and another, 1(2006) 4 SCC 322 the Supreme Court has held as follows:

“6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, (1969) 1 SCC 185. Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably.”

(ii) Long delay cannot be allowed to be condoned as a matter of course in view of the recent judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Shivamma v. Karnataka Housing Board, 22025 INSC 1104, wherein it is held as under: “258. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the respondents, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, it cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.”

(iii) In a recent decision in Thirunagalingam v. Lingeswaran and another, 32025 INSC 672 the Supreme Court held thus:

“31. It is a well-settled law that while considering the plea for condonation of delay, the first and foremost duty of the court is to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation rather than starting with the merits of the main matter. Only when sufficient cause or reasons given for the delay by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced or stand on equal footing, the court may consider the merits of the main matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.

32. Further, this Court has repeatedly emphasised in several cases that delay should not be condoned merely as an act of generosity. The purs