Heard on the application seeking condonation of delay of 639 days in filing the writ appeal, which assails the order dated 12.01.2024 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.No.805 of 2024.

2. In the affidavit filed in support of the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, it is stated that the applicant/ appellant is a senior citizen aged about 71 years and he requested for reconveyance of 10 cents of land in S.No.64/22, Mukundarayapuram Village, said to have been acquired for SIPCOT in the year 2000, which was rejected, however, according to the applicant, the said land has never been utilised. Challenging the said rejection, the applicant/appellant has filed the writ petition and the same was dismissed at the admission stage itself observing that the land was in use by SIPCOT under DCTP approval and that compensation has also been deposited. The said order is impugned in the writ appeal, which has been presented with a delay of 639 days.

3. The cause shown for the delay is that the applicant is a senior citizen aged about 71 years and has been suffering from cardiac ailment and therefore, could not pursue the court proceedings diligently, which has resulted in the delay. According to the applicant, the delay is neither wilful nor wanton but due to bonafide reasons, as stated above.

4. The issue relating to condonation of delay is no longer res integra, and the Supreme Court has settled the legal position through a catena of decisions, of which relevant paragraphs of a few decisions are reproduced hereunder:

(i) In Karnataka Power Corporation Ltd. V. K. Thangappan and another, 1(2006) 4 SCC 322, the Supreme Court has held as follows:

“6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, (1969) 1 SCC 185. Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably.”

(ii) Long delay cannot be allowed to be condoned as a matter of course in view of the recent judgment of the Apex Court in the case

of Shivamma v. Karnataka Housing Board, 22025 INSC 1104, wherein it is held as under:

“258. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the respondents, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, it cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced tha