Back
2026 Supreme(Online)(Mad) 55034
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
L.Victoria Gowri, J
China Arumugam – Appellant
Versus
S.P.Rasiya Fathima – Respondent
Crl.O.P.(MD).No.284 of 2026|Crl.M.P.(MD)No.275 of 2026
For the Appellants/Petitioners: B.Saravanan, RM.Arun Swaminathan
For the Respondents: G.Prabhu Rajadurai, I.Robert Chandrakumar
The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, cannot be invoked to resolve property disputes or enforce residential rights in the absence of a subsisting domestic relationship and proximate domestic violence, particularly after decades of separate living.
Headnote:(A) Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 - Sections 2(f), 2(s), 3, 17, 18, 19 and 22 - Domestic relationship - Shared household - Quashing of proceedings - Appellant and Respondent living separately for nearly twenty years - No proximate domestic relationship or shared household - Proceedings initiated as a counterblast to property disputes - Abuse of process - Legislation cannot be used as a sword to resurrect stale property claims - Held, proceedings quashed. (Paras 19, 21, 23, 25, 31, 35)
Facts of the case:
The respondent-wife sought reliefs under the Act against the petitioners (in-laws/relatives) despite having resided separately for nearly two decades. The petitioners contended that the second respondent had converted to another religion, the family had severed ties, and the complaint was filed purely to pressure them in a property-related dispute.
Findings of Court:
Proceedings under the Act cannot be sustained in the absence of a live domestic relationship or shared household. The court observed that the complaint was vague, lacked specific acts of domestic violence, and was filed with a motive to resolve property disputes via coercion.
Issues: Whether a domestic relationship exists after twenty years of separation and whether a civil property dispute can be entertained under the DV Act.
Ratio Decidendi: The Act's protective jurisdiction is reserved for genuine domestic violence within a subsisting domestic relationship; it cannot be invoked to revive stale claims or as a substitute for civil litigation for property recovery.
Result: Petition allowed; proceedings quashed.
| Table of Content |
|---|
| 1. the scope and purpose of the protection of women from domestic violence act. (Para 1 , 2 , 3 , 36 , 37) |
| 2. factual background regarding the long separation and property dispute. (Para 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8) |
| 3. summary of contentions raised by both parties. (Para 9 , 10 , 11 , 12 , 13 , 14 , 15) |
| 4. legal analysis on the absence of domestic relationship and shared household warranting quashment. (Para 17 , 18 , 19 , 20 , 21 , 22 , 23 , 24 , 25 , 26 , 27 , 28 , 29 , 30 , 31 , 32 , 33 , 34 , 35) |
| 5. final outcome of the petition. (Para 38) |
Prayer : Criminal Original Petition is filed under Section 528 of BNSS, 2023, to call for the records of the complaint in DVC No. 169/2025 on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate cum Additional Mahila Court, Madurai and quash the same.
ORDER
Prologue:
1. The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, is a beneficent legislation enacted to protect women from violence within the precincts of a domestic relationship. Its purpose is noble; its reach is wide; and its spirit is remedial. But no beneficent statute can be permitted to be converted into a weapon of oppression, property coercion or family vengeance.
2. A legislation conceived as a shield for genuine victims of domestic violence cannot be permitted to be wielded as a sword to resurrect stale property claims, to pressurise aged parents, or to drag distant relatives into avoidable litigation without the basic statutory foundation of domestic relationship, shared household or proximate domestic violence.
3. The present case is one such instance where the Court is called upon to decide whether the machinery of the DV Act has been invoked for protection against domestic violence or whether it has been employed as a collateral pressure device in a property-centred family dispute.
4. The first respondent is the wife of the second respondent. The second respondent is the son of petitioners 1 and 2 and the brother of the third petitioner. Petitioners 4 and 5 are the daughter and son-in-law of the third petitioner. According to the first respondent, she married the second respondent on 14.11.1999 in accordance with Hindu rites and, after marriage, resided in the matrimonial home along with the petitioners.
5. It is further alleged that her name was included in the ration card of the petitioners’ family and that the respondents continued to have business association with the petitioners till the year 2018. The first respondent states that she is a cancer survivor and that due to financial hardship, she requested the petitioners to permit her to reside in the alleged matrimonial home. Since the said request was refused, she filed D.V.C.No.169 of 2025 seeking reliefs under Sections 18, 19 and 22 of the DV Act.
Case of the Petitioners:
6. The petitioners contend that the second respondent voluntarily converted from Hinduism to Islam in or about the year 1998 and executed an unregistered release deed dated 18.02.1998, severing his family ties with the Hindu joint family. It is further submitted that the respondents themselves converted to Islam and have admittedly been living separately for nearly twenty years.
7. According to the petitioners, there has been no cohabitation, domestic relationship, shared household, family association or interaction between the parties for more than two decades. The petitioners submit that the first respondent is attempting to enter the ancestral Hindu family house only after disputes arose with regard to money and property.
8. It is further submitted that the second respondent attempted to conduct Islamic religious ceremonies in the ancestral Hindu house, resulting in serious objection and police intervention. The petitioners contend that only after refusal of such property-related demands, the impugned D.V.C. proceedings were instituted as a counterblast and as a pressure tactic.
Grounds for quash:
9. The petitioners seek quashment on the following grounds:
(i) the first respondent has not liv
