2026 Supreme(Online)(Mad) 56427
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari, CJ, G. Arul Murugan, J
District Collector Coimbatore District – Appellant
Versus
T K Subramaniam – Respondent
C.M.P.No.27153 of 2025|W.A.No.SR 170728 of 2025
Important Points
Subject
Civil - Limitation
Act Referred
Headnote
For the Appellants/Petitioners: K. Kumaran
For the Respondents: S. Shrish, N. Manokaran
| Table of Content |
|---|
| 1. application for condonation of 1227 days' delay based on administrative reasons. (Para 1 , 2) |
| 2. legal standards for condoning delay emphasize bona fides over merits. (Para 3) |
| 3. dismissal of application due to lack of cogent reasons for inordinate delay. (Para 4 , 5) |
Prayer : (i) C.M.P.No.27153 of 2025 filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking to condone the delay of 1227 days in filing the appeal.
(ii) Appeal filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent seeking to set aside the order dated 18.04.2022 passed in W.P.No.26286 of 2015.
JUDGMENT
(Judgment of the Court was delivered by the Hon'ble Chief Justice)
1. Heard on the application seeking condonation of delay of 1227 days in filing the writ appeal, which assails the order dated 18.04.2022 passed passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.26286 of 2015.
2. In the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, it is stated that after receipt of the certified copy of the order after a month, opinion was sought nearly after one month and opinion was received not to file appeal. In the meantime, pursuant to an order, respondent made a representation. In order to comply with the said order, respondent searched for records and they traced old files from which they found there were suppression of facts and therefore, again opinion was sought and thereafter, filed the appeal. Thus, the delay has occurred, which is neither wilful nor wanton, but purely due to administrative reasons.
3. The issue relating to condonation of delay is no longer res integra, and the Supreme Court has settled the legal position through a catena of decisions, of which relevant paragraphs of a few decisions are reproduced hereunder:
(i) In Karnataka Power Corporation Ltd. V. K. Thangappan and another , 1(2006) 4 SCC 322, the Supreme Court has held as follows:
“6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, (1969) 1 SCC 185. Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably.”
(ii) Long delay cannot be allowed to be condoned as a matter of course in view of the recent judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Shivamma v. Karnataka Housing Board , 22025 INSC 1104, wherein it is held as under:
“258. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the respondents, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, it cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.”
(iii) In a recent decision in Thiruna