PRAYER in C.M.P.No.9621 of 2026 : Petition filed under Section 260A (2A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 to condone the delay of 2415 days in filing the appeal.

PRAYER in W.A.SR.No.37994 of 2026 : Appeal filed under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, to set aside the order dated 03.04.2017 passed in I.T.(S.S)A.No.09/Mds/2016 on the file of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal ‘A’ Bench, Chennai.

(Delivered by G.ARUL MURUGAN, J.)

The civil miscellaneous petition seeks to condone the delay of 2415 days in preferring the tax case appeal assailing the order dated 03.04.2017 passed in I.T.(S.S)A.No.09/Mds/2016 on the file of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal ‘A’ Bench, Chennai.

2. Heard Mr.Varun Ranganathan TN, learned counsel for the petitioner/appellant and perused the materials available on record.

3. In support of the petition, the petitioner has averred that her mother is 80 years old and lives in Madurai suffering from age-related issues. In addition, it is averred that the petitioner was not unable to file the tax case appeal in time due to the health reasons of her counsel and details of the treatment taken by the counsel have been provided. Further, since the petitioner’s mother is a senior citizen and was taking various medical treatments, delay of 2415 days had occurred in filing the appeal.

4. The issue relating to condonation of delay is no longer res integra, and the Supreme Court has settled the legal position through a catena of decisions, of which relevant paragraphs of a few decisions are reproduced hereunder:

(i) In Karnataka Power Corporation Ltd. v. K. Thangappan and another [(2006) 4 SCC 322], the Supreme Court has held as follows:

“6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, (1969) 1 SCC 185. Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably.”

(ii) In Basawaraj v. Land Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14 SCC 81], the Honorable Supreme Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judicially, and the expression ‘sufficient cause’ cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party and the delay cannot be justified by imposing conditions. The relevant portion is extracted hereunder:

“9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged