The High Court has jurisdiction to extend time for arbitration proceedings, provided the arbitrator was appointed by it, reflecting legislative intent requiring contextual interpretation of 'Court' in the Arbitration Act.

ORDER

This application has been filed under Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for brevity "Act of 1996") by the claimant for extension of time for conclusion of arbitration proceedings.

2. The relevant facts of the case are that the applicant is a private company incorporated under the provisions of Companies Act, 1956 having its registered office at Kolkata. It is engaged in the business of construction for railways and other governmental organizations, civil works related thereto and other various tenders throughout India.

3. The respondent is an educational institution and one of the sixth IITs which were established in the academic year of 2008-2009. Earlier, vide an order dated 08.09.2023, this Court appointed sole arbitrator by invoking provisions of Section 11 of the Act of 1996 on an application filed by the present applicant/claimant. Pursuant to the appointment of arbitrator, proceedings were initiated. The applicant filed its statement of claim on 29.11.2023. The respondent filed its statement of defence on 26.02.2024. The last meeting was held on 28.06.2025 on which date the final arguments stood concluded. Parties were granted two months' time to file written submissions and thus, now only passing of final award is remaining. As the time for concluding the arbitral proceedings was going to expire on 25.08.2025, the present application for extension of time has been filed.

4. Before adverting to the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, it would be profitable to record at this stage that on the merits of the proceedings i.e. the manner and mandate of the arbitrator is not under dispute. Both the parties have advanced their arguments only on the question of jurisdiction of this Court to extend the time in terms of the provisions of Section 29A of the Act of 1996.

5. Learned counsel for the applicant argued that as it is this Court who appointed the arbitrator by invoking the provisions of Section 11 (6) of the Act, 1996, thus, the application would lie before this Court only as Section 29A also included power to substitute the arbitrator(s). He submits that the extension of time which is being sought has no relation with the adjudication of dispute on merits and as the arbitrator is appointed by this Court as such power to extend time would lie before this Court. He points out that any other interpretation of provision would lead to an anomaly inasmuch as if either of the parties seeks extension of time along with substitution of arbitrator then it has to approach this Court and in case extension of time simplicitor is sought then principal civil court has to be approached which will create uncertainty and unnecessary hardship for smooth resolution of the dispute which is contrary to the very objective of mechanism under arbitration. He further submits that in fact the provision of will have to be considered in the context of the fact of a given case. He points out that there can be two situations, one where the arbitrator is appointed by mutual consent and the other where the arbitrator is appointed by this Court. According to the learned counsel, in first situation the principal civil court can extend the time, however, it can still not substitute the arbitrator for the reason that the intention of the legislature is clear that it is only this Court that has been given power in terms of of the Act of 1996 to appoint arbitrator and in the second situation, where arbitrator has been appointed by this Court it is this Court only which can extend the time and also can substitute the arbitrator.

6. Controverting the arguments of th