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2024 Supreme(SC) 913

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Abhay S. Oka, Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.
Chief Engineer (NH) PWD (Roads) - Petitioner
Versus
BSC & C and C JV - Respondent
Petition for special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 10544 of 2024
Decided On : 13-05-2024

Advocates:
Advocate Appeared:
For the Appellant :Mr. Aditya Shankar Pandey Advocate, Mr. Avijit Mani Tripathi Advocate, Mr. Amit Kumar Advocate, Ms. Himanshu Sehrawat Advocate, Ms. Rekha Bakshi Advocate
For the Respondent:Mr. Gourab Banerji Senior, Advocate, Mr. Abhinav Raghuvanshi Advocate, Mr. Anshuman Pandey Advocate, Mr. Ranjit Prakash Advocate, Mr. Sanya Gangar Advocate

Jurisdiction under Section 29A of the Arbitration Act to extend award deadlines or substitute arbitrators is limited to courts with original civil jurisdiction; absent this, petitions lack merit.

Headnote:(A) Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 29A - Time limit for arbitral award - Court's power to extend the award period and substitute arbitrators is contingent upon having original civil jurisdiction - High Court lacked this jurisdiction, thus rendering the Special Leave Petition without merit. (Paras 2-5)

(B) Procedure - The High Court cannot exercise powers under Section 29A as it does not possess ordinary original civil jurisdiction; any delay attributable to arbitrators can lead to their replacement but must be governed by the court with proper authority. (Paras 3-4)

Facts of the case:
The petitioner sought to challenge the delay in an arbitral award process, citing the need for the court to either extend the time for award or substitute arbitrators.

Findings of Court:
The High Court's lack of original jurisdiction prevents it from exercising powers under Section 29A, thereby confirming that it cannot entertain the petition.

Issues: Whether the High Court had the jurisdiction to extend the time frame for the arbiter or to substitute the arbiters due to delay.

Ratio Decidendi: The court held that section 29A necessitates jurisdictional authority, which the High Court did not possess, consequently leading to the dismissal of the petition.

Result: Special Leave Petition dismissed.

Table of Content
1. court's authority under section 29a of arbitration act (Para 2 , 3 , 4)
2. dismissal of special leave petition (Para 5)

JUDGMENT :

Abhay S. Oka, J.

Heard the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner.

2. Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, “the Arbitration Act”) reads thus:

    “29A.Time limit for arbitral award.—

    (1) The award in matters other than international commercial arbitration shall be made by the arbitral tribunal within a period of twelve months from the date of completion of pleadings under sub-section (4) of section 23.

    Provided that the award in the matter of international commercial arbitration may be made as expeditiously as possible and endeavour may be made to dispose off the matter within a period of twelve months from the date of completion of pleadings under sub-section (4) of section 23.

    (2) If the award is made within a period of six months from the date the arbitral tribunal enters upon the reference, the arbitral tribunal shall be entitled to receive such amount of additional fees as the parties may agree.

    (3) The parties may, by consent, extend the period specified in sub-section (1) for making award for a further period not exceeding six months.

    (4) If the award is not made within the period specified in sub-section (1) or the extended period specified under sub-section (3), the mandate of the arbitrator(s) shall terminate unless the Court has, either prior to or after the expiry of the period so specified, extended the period:

    Provided that while extending the period under this sub-section, if the Court finds that the proceedings have been delayed for the reasons attributable to the arbitral tribunal, then, it may order reduction of fees of arbitrator(s) by not exceeding five per cent. for each month of such delay:

    Provided further that where an application under sub-section (5) is pending, the mandate of the arbitrator shall continue till the disposal of the said application:

    Provided also that the arbitrator shall be given an opportunity of being heard before the fees is reduced.

    (5) The extension of period referred to in subsection (4) may be on the application of any of the parties and may be granted only for sufficient cause and on such terms and conditions as may be imposed by the Court.

    (6) While extending the period referred to in subsection (4), it shall be open to the Court to substitute one or all of the arbitrators and if one or all of the arbitrators are substituted, the arbitral proceedings shall continue from the stage already reached and on the basis of the evidence and material already on record, and the arbitrator(s) appointed under this section shall be deemed to have received the said evidence and material.

    (7) In the event of arbitrator(s) being appointed under this section, the arbitral tribunal thus reconstituted shall be deemed to be in continuation of the previously appointed arbitral tribunal.

    (8) It shall be open to the Court to impose actual or exemplary costs upon any of the parties under this section.

    (9) An application filed under sub-section (5) shall be disposed of by the Court as expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be made to dispose of the matter within a period of sixty days from the date of service of notice on the opposite party.”

    (underlines supplied)

3. The power under sub-Section (4) of Section 29A of the Arbitration Act vests in the Court as defined in Section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration Act. It is the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district which includes a High Court provided the High Court has ordinary original civil jurisdiction.

4. In this case, the High Court does not have the ordinary original civil jurisdiction. The power under sub-Section (6) of Section 29A is only a consequential power vesting in the Court which is empowered to extend the time. If the Court finds that the cause of delay is one or all of the arbitrators, while extending the time, the Court has power to replace and

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