1. Appeal against acquittal under Prevention of Corruption Act filed with 236 days delay seeking condonation. (Para 2 , 3 )
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2026 Supreme(Online)(MP) 112097
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH AT JABALPUR
Sanjeev S Kalgaonkar, J
Special Police Establishment Lokayukt Office – Appellant
Versus
Bhutan Sahu – Respondent
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 6809 of 2026
Important Points
Government entities are not entitled to preferential treatment or automatic condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act; routine bureaucratic red-tape constitutes an "excuse" rather than "sufficient cause," and parity must be maintained between the state and private litigants to ensure accountability.
Subject
Criminal Law - Condonation of Delay
Act Referred
Limitation Act, 1963: S.5
BNSS, 2023: S.419
Cr.P.C.: S.378
Prevention of Corruption Act: S.7, S.13(1)(d), S.10
BNSS, 2023: S.419
Cr.P.C.: S.378
Prevention of Corruption Act: S.7, S.13(1)(d), S.10
Headnote
(A) Limitation Act, 1963 - Section 5 - Condonation of delay - Appeal against acquittal - Delay of 236 days - Condonation of delay is a discretionary power available to courts, the exercise of which depends upon the sufficiency of the cause shown and the degree of acceptability of the explanation (Para 8) - Distinction between an "explanation" and an "excuse"; an explanation clarifies circumstances and demonstrates genuine action, whereas an excuse is a defensive action to deny responsibility (Para 8) - Routine procedural movement of files through official channels for approval, without disclosing genuine and bona fide impediments, does not amount to sufficient cause but is a stereo-typed excuse (Para 11).
(B) State and Government Entities - Parity between government and private litigants - Earlier jurisprudence that accorded preferential indulgence to the State based on bureaucratic complexities and institutional inertia no longer reflects the correct position of law (Para 10) - Public interest is served not by excusing governmental inefficiency, but by fostering accountability, diligence, and responsibility in the conduct of public litigation (Para 10) - The State is under a higher duty to act in time as a trustee of the people's interest (Para 10).
Facts of the case:
An appeal was preferred by the appellant against a judgment of acquittal involving charges under the Prevention of Corruption Act. The application for grant of leave to appeal was filed with a delay of 236 days beyond the prescribed period of 90 days. The appellant attributed the delay to the functioning of the State Government, including the time consumed in obtaining legal opinions and headquarters' approval.
Findings of Court:
The Court found that the explanation provided by the appellant manifested bureaucratic lethargy, inaction, and a lack of diligence. The delay attributable to the appointment of the Officer-in-Charge and the preparation of the appeal was avoidable. The reasons proffered were termed as a "lame excuse" rather than a cogent and satisfactory explanation.
Issues: Whether the delay of 236 days caused by official procedural movement and bureaucratic functioning constitutes "sufficient cause" for condonation under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
Ratio Decidendi: The court ruled that government entities cannot claim automatic or presumptive benefit of condonation on the ground of bureaucratic lethargy. Condonation of delay must be based on a genuine, bona fide explanation and not a formal excuse for bureaucratic formality, especially when the delay impinges upon the accrued right of liberty of an acquitted person.
Result: Appeal dismissed.
(B) State and Government Entities - Parity between government and private litigants - Earlier jurisprudence that accorded preferential indulgence to the State based on bureaucratic complexities and institutional inertia no longer reflects the correct position of law (Para 10) - Public interest is served not by excusing governmental inefficiency, but by fostering accountability, diligence, and responsibility in the conduct of public litigation (Para 10) - The State is under a higher duty to act in time as a trustee of the people's interest (Para 10).
Facts of the case:
An appeal was preferred by the appellant against a judgment of acquittal involving charges under the Prevention of Corruption Act. The application for grant of leave to appeal was filed with a delay of 236 days beyond the prescribed period of 90 days. The appellant attributed the delay to the functioning of the State Government, including the time consumed in obtaining legal opinions and headquarters' approval.
Findings of Court:
The Court found that the explanation provided by the appellant manifested bureaucratic lethargy, inaction, and a lack of diligence. The delay attributable to the appointment of the Officer-in-Charge and the preparation of the appeal was avoidable. The reasons proffered were termed as a "lame excuse" rather than a cogent and satisfactory explanation.
Issues: Whether the delay of 236 days caused by official procedural movement and bureaucratic functioning constitutes "sufficient cause" for condonation under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
Ratio Decidendi: The court ruled that government entities cannot claim automatic or presumptive benefit of condonation on the ground of bureaucratic lethargy. Condonation of delay must be based on a genuine, bona fide explanation and not a formal excuse for bureaucratic formality, especially when the delay impinges upon the accrued right of liberty of an acquitted person.
Result: Appeal dismissed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
- practice and procedure
-
crime and sentencing
-
offences against public administration
- prevention of corruption act (Para 2)
-
offences against public administration
Advocates:
For the Appellants/Petitioners: Abhinav Shrivastava, Ankita Ahuja
For the Appellants/Petitioners: Abhinav Shrivastava, Ankita Ahuja
Table of Contents
2. State attributed delay to bureaucratic process; respondent argued no sufficient cause shown for condonation. (Para 3 , 4 )
3. Explanation of bureaucratic delay without specifics of impediments is a lame excuse, not sufficient cause. (Para 12 , 13 , 14 )
4. Postmaster General overruled special leniency for state; sufficient cause requires bona fide explanation, not routine red-tape. (Para 11 , 14 )
5. Application for condonation of delay dismissed; consequently appeal dismissed as time-barred. (Para 16 , 17 )
6. What constitutes 'sufficient cause' under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for state entities?
Bona fide explanation showing reasonable diligence is required; routine bureaucratic red-tape or procedural delays without specifics of impediments are not sufficient cause. (Para 11 , 14 )
7. Can the state claim special leniency for condonation of delay based on bureaucratic machinery?
No; the law has evolved to treat state and private litigants equally. Postmaster General overruled earlier liberal approach, requiring state to demonstrate bona fides and diligence. (Para 9 , 10 , 11 )
8. What is the impact of delay in filing appeal against acquittal on the right of the accused?
Delay impinges on the accused's accrued right to liberty after acquittal. A substantial burden lies on the appellant to demonstrate sufficient cause. (Para 12 )
ORDER
Heard on I.A. No.22678/2026, an application for condonation of delay filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
2. The Special Police Establishment, Lokayukta, State of M.P., preferred an appeal under Section 419 of BNSS, 2023 / under Section 378 of Cr.P.C. feeling aggrieved by the judgment of acquittal dated 10.09.2025 passed in Special Case No. LOK/05/2016 by the Special Judge, Lokayukta District Rewa whereby, the respondent has been acquitted of the charges of offence punishable under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) r/w Section 13(2) and 10 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Since, the application for grant of leave was filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation of 90 days from the date of judgment of acquittal, the appellant submitted an application for condonation of delay.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the application for grant of leave to appeal is presented with a delay of 236 days. The delay is explained in the application. The impugned judgment of acquittal was pronounced on 10.09.2025. The certified copy of impugned judgment was obtained on 19.09.2025. The Special Prosecutor, Rewa sent all the relevant documents to the Superintendent of Police, Lokayukta. The opinion of the Special Public Prosecutor, Rewa was received on 08.10.2025 which was then forwarded to the Headquarters. The approval for filing of appeal was received from the Headquarters vide letter dated 29.10.2025. Thereafter, on 31.10.2025, the In-charge Officer Shri Praveen Singh Parihar was appointed and was directed to contact the counsel to submit the appeal. The same was submitted to the standing counsel, Lokayukta on 08.11.2025 and 19.12.2025. The delay is attributable to the functioning of the State Government requiring permission, deliberations at various levels which consumed time. The delay of 236 days is unintentional and bonafide and deserves to be condoned to facilitate the hearing of the appeal on merits. The dismissal of appeal merely on delay may have adverse effect on the administration of justice. Learned counsel referred to the judgment of Supreme Court in case of State of Nagaland vs. Lipok AO and Ors. reported in 2005 (3) SCC 752 to bolster her contentions regarding condonation of delay in matters involving public machinery.
4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent opposes the application and submits that reasonable explanation for delay has not been pleaded in the application. The reasons are vague and unsatisfactory. Learned counsel referring to the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Shivamna vs. Karnataka Housing Board and Ors. reported in 2025 INSC 1104, contends that the State authorities does not deserve any special treatment in explaining the delay. The sufficient cause has to be established for grant of condonation of delay. The application is meritless.
5. Heard both the parties and perused the record.
6. There is no controversy that application for grant of leave to appeal against the impugned judgment of acquittal is filed with a delay of 236 days. The appellant has submitted the explanation that the delay in filing the application is attributable to red-tape and the procedural delay involved in functioning of public authorities.
7. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Nagaland vs. Lipok AO (supra) observed as under :-
"13. Experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. The State which represents collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The courts, therefore, have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression of sufficient cause. Merit is prefe
