SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Audio Icon Pause Audio Icon
judgment-img

2026 Supreme(Online)(P&H) 109

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
JAI SINGH – Appellant
Versus
PRITHVI RAJ – Respondent



A strip of land in the shape of a street does not become a public street without evidence of dedication and public user; a municipal sale of such land is not ultra vires if it was never a public street.

Headnote:(A) Municipal Law - Public Street - Alienation of land by municipal authority - A public street is not constituted merely because land is in the shape of a street or appears as such in a site plan or private sale deed - Dedication to public, whether express or implied, requires clear intention to devote land for public use, established by unequivocal acts and acceptance by public through open, uninterrupted and long user - Mere recital in a sale deed or site plan describing land as a passage does not by itself establish legal existence of such passage unless corroborated by independent evidence - If land has been lawfully dedicated as a public street, it vests in municipal authority qua street for purposes of public passage; such vesting does not confer absolute ownership but a special statutory interest - Municipality cannot alter public use by selling or leasing land for private purposes inconsistent with dedicated status. (Paras 12, 14, 18)

(B) Evidence - Contemporaneous documentary evidence - Earliest official correspondence describing land as vacant land carries considerable evidentiary value, being prior in point of time to private purchase and construction - Description of land as being in the shape of a street refers only to physical configuration, not legal character - Explanation in official letters that land was left unauctioned due to peculiar shape and limited utility, and was neither required for traffic nor useful to municipality, supports finding of no dedication. (Paras 13, 16-17)

(C) Sale deed - Validity - When land is found as a matter of fact not to be a public street but vacant municipal land lawfully sold after due procedure, valuation and approvals, the sale cannot be set aside merely on basis of its shape or depiction in private plans - Plaintiff’s own interest in purchasing the land indicates that he did not treat it as a public street. (Paras 20, 23, 24)

Facts of the case:
The plaintiff purchased a plot in 1985 and raised construction. He claimed that a 10-foot wide strip on the southern side of his house was a close street, and that the Municipal Committee illegally sold that strip to defendant No.2 in 1988, blocking his doors and ventilators. The plaintiff challenged the sale deed. The trial court dismissed the suit, holding the strip was not a street. The first appellate court reversed, declaring the sale void as the strip was a public street. The present appeal is against that reversal.

Findings of Court:
The disputed property was never a public street; it was vacant land owned by the Municipal Committee. The earliest official record (1983) described it as vacant land leased to defendant No.2. Subsequent correspondence referred to it as land 'in the shape of a street', not as an actual street. There was no evidence of dedication or public user. The plaintiff’s own attempt to purchase the land contradicted his claim. The municipal sale was lawful after due process. The first appellate court’s finding that the land was a public street was erroneous.

Issues: (i) Whether the property in dispute is a street? (ii) If it is a street, whether the Municipal Committee could alienate it? (iii) If not a street, whether the sale deed could be set aside?

Ratio Decidendi: A public street requires proof of dedication and public acceptance; physical shape alone is insufficient. Contemporaneous official documents showing the land as vacant and not dedicated prevail over later private recitals. A municipal sale of land that is not a public street is not ultra vires. Result : Appeal allowed. The judgment and decree of the first appellate court is reversed. The trial court’s judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s suit is restored.

PW3/C), situated within the municipal limits of Jhajjar, vide a registered sale deed dated 11.06.1985 (Ex.PW3/A), from its previous owners, namely Sushila Mehta and Krishana Chawla, daughters of Inderjeet Mehta. The boundaries of the said land, as reflected in the sale deed, are as under:

- East: House of Dina Ram – 24 feet

- West: Public road (sare-aam) – 24 feet

- North: Closed street / pathway – 59 feet

- South: Closed street / pathway and house of Dalal – 59 feet

3.2 It is further pleaded that after obtaining approval of the site plan from the Municipal Committee on 24.01.1986, the plaintiff raised construction of a residential house over the said land. He opened doors, ventilators, and outlets for discharge of water towards a street measuring 10 feet in width, situated on the southern side of his house, shown by letters ‘CDEF’ in red colour in the site plan (Ex.PW3/C). According to the plaintiff, water supply and sewerage connections were also provided towards the said southern street.

3.3 The grievance of the plaintiff is that defendant No.1—the Municipal Committee, Jhajjar (now proforma respondent No.2), illegally sold the aforesaid street to defendant No.2, Jai Singh (appellant herein), vide sale deed dated 08.03.1988 (Ex.PW3/1), with the intent to harm the plaintiff and to block his doors, ventilators, and other outlets opening towards the said street.

3.4 The plaintiff, therefore, challenged the legality and validity of the sale deed dated 08.03.1988 as being illegal, null and void, and further sought a decree of permanent injunction restraining defendant No.2 from raising any construction over the said street.

4.1 Both the defendants filed separate written statements. However, their defence was substantially identical. They denied that the disputed property constituted a Gali (street).

4.2 According to defendant No.1—the Municipal Committee, the suit property, though alleged by the plaintiff to be a street, was in fact land belonging to defendant No.2, which had been left for the construction of his garage and was merely being used as a passage, without acquiring the character of a public street. It was pleaded that the said land was initially leased to defendant No.2 in the year 1983 and was subsequently sold to him vide a registered sale deed dated 08.03.1988, a8er obtaining the requisite approval from the competent authorities.

4.3 Defendant No.2, in his separate written statement, reiterated the aforesaid stand and asserted that he had lawfully purchased the disputed property from the Municipal Committee for a consideration of Rs.6,400/- vide registered sale deed dated 08.03.1988. He further denied the allegation that the plaintiff had opened any door, ventilator, or outlet towards the alleged street.

4.4 With these pleadings, and while controverting the remaining averments of the plaint, both the defendants prayed for dismissal of the suit.

5. Upon completion of the pleadings, necessary issues were framed. The parties led their respective evidence. Upon appreciation thereof, the learned trial Court held that a part of the disputed portion, measuring approximately 9 to 10 feet in width and 30 feet in length, was a close street situated on the southern side of the plaintiff’s house, and that the Municipal Committee was justified in alienating the same in favour of defendant No.2. On the basis of the said finding on the principal issue, the suit was dismissed.

6.1 Aggrieved thereby, the plaintiff preferred an appeal. The learned First Appellate Court, upon reappraisal of the entire evidence, recorded a finding that the entire stretch on the southern side of the plaintiff’s house could not be held to be a street, as alleged by the plaintiff, and that only a portion measuring 36 feet in length and 10 feet in width constituted a close street. The contention of the plaintiff that the entire 10 feet wide stretch on the southern side of his house was a public street was held to be not proved. To that extent, the First Appellate Cour

Click Here to Read the rest of this document
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
logo-black

An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers

Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance

qr

Scan Me!

India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!

For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :

whatsapp-icon Back to top