JUDGMENT

1. This appeal has arisen out of a suit brought by the plaintiff-respondent against the Municipal Committee, Delhi, for a permanent injunction to restrain the said Municipal Committee from putting up a building on the highway just in front of his property, to demolish any part of the building which has already been constructed and also to remove a tonga stand which has been set up in continuation of this structure. The plaintiff's main allegations were that the frontage of his property will be obstructed if the Municipal Committee was not restrained, its free enjoyment will be interfered with, its value will depreciate, the health of the locality as well as the comfort and convenience of the occupants of his property will suffer and his right of way will be impaired. He further averred that this act of the Committee was ultra vires as the obstruction was being put up on the Grand Trunk Road which is a public highway.

2. The Municipal. Committee resisted this suit on the grounds that a platform had been in existence at the spot for more than 5 years, that it was the same platform on which the new stalls were being constructed, that the Committee possessed full authority to close, any highroad they liked, that no special injury was caused to the plaintiff and that the plaintiff's suit was barred by the statute of. limitation.

3. The only 3 issues that were framed by the learned Subordinate Judge were (1) Is the Committee constructing shops and a tonga stand on a portion of the highroad? (2) If so, will defendant's act result in special injury to the plaintiff and is he therefore competent to sue for injunction? (3) Is the suit within time?

4. The learned Subordinate Judge found the first and third issues in favour of the plaintiff but decided the second issue against him on the ground that the act of the Committee had not been prompted by any malicious, revengeful or sordid motives and though it may cause annoyance to the occupants of the plaintiff's house and inconvenience to the general traffic, it has not resulted and will not result in any special injury to the plaintiff. He therefore dismissed the plaintiff's suit with costs.

5. On appeal the learned District Judge came to the conclusion that the Punjab Municipal Act did not confer any powers on the Committee which authorised it to override the rights which the public or any member of the public already possessed outside the Act, that the particular nuisance of which the plaintiff complained affected his property and his property alone and that he suffered all the inconvenience and loss which was incurred by the owner of a house abutting on a main road and suddenly found a construction springing up a few feet away from his property. He further found that the construction of the tonga stand intensified the inconvenience already arising from the construction of the building, that the Committee had not acted under any laws and its inviting tonga drivers to park their carriages at the short distance from the plaintiff's house constituted a nuisance in fact and the noise, smell and general inconvenience caused by the putting up of a carriage stand were a source of special injury both to the comfort as well as to the health of the persons occupying the plaintiff's house. He came to the conclusion that the Committee was not protected in either of its acts by the statutory powers and the plaintiff had made out a sufficiently substantial case of special damages. He was of opinion that it was not possible to estimate the pecuniary value of the damage and in these circumstances an injunction was the only proper remedy that the plaintiff could seek. He therefore decreed his suit as lodged. Hence this second appeal by the Municipal Committee, Delhi.

6. The learned Counsel for the appellant has attacked the finding's of the learned District Judge on the following grounds: (a) The act of the Municipal Committee is authorized by the Statute hence the civil Court cannot interfere; (b) no