ORDER :

1. The instant criminal writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been preferred on behalf of the petitioner assailing the order dated 14.01.2026 passed by the learned District Collector, Bhilwara, whereby the petitioner’s prayer seeking grant of second parole for a period of 30 days has been declined.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the parole application of the petitioner has been rejected on mechanical and extraneous considerations, despite the fact that the petitioner fulfils the eligibility criteria under the applicable rules and his conduct in jail has been reported to be satisfactory. It is further submitted that vague apprehensions expressed by the police authorities cannot constitute valid grounds for denial of parole.

3. Learned AAG submitted that since the victim and the convict reside in the same village and in close proximity to each other, the release of the convict on parole may pose a potential threat to the safety and security of the victim as well as her family members, and therefore, he ought not to be granted the benefit of parole.

4. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and learned AAG as well as perused the material available on record.

5. The apprehension expressed by the learned AAG that the victim and the convict reside in the same village and, therefore, the convict ought not to be released on parole, cannot be accepted in its absolute and inflexible terms. The mere circumstance that the victim and the convict belong to the same village, by itself, cannot constitute a valid ground to deny the benefit of parole. If such a proposition were to be accepted as a rule of universal application, the very purpose for which the concept of parole has been evolved in criminal jurisprudence would stand frustrated.

5.1 Parole is not conceived merely as an act of administrative indulgence; rather, it is an integral facet of the reformative approach that underlies modern penology. The object of parole is to enable a convict to maintain his social and familial ties and to facilitate his gradual reintegration into the mainstream of society. A prisoner, though deprived of his liberty for the commission of an offence, does not cease to be a member of society. The law does not contemplate his permanent social isolation. On the contrary, the philosophy of parole recognises that a convict must be afforded a meaningful opportunity to reconnect with the social environment so that he may reflect upon his past conduct and endeavour to reform himself.

5.2 The apprehension voiced by the prosecution proceeds on the assumption that the mere presence of the convict in the same village as the victim would necessarily endanger the latter. Such a submission, in the considered opinion of this Court, appears to be founded more upon conjecture than upon any concrete material placed on record. The criminal justice system cannot operate on bald and speculative presumptions. Unless there exists tangible material to indicate a real and imminent threat, the denial of parole on such a generalized apprehension would not be justified. Equally important is the practical dimension of the matter.

5.3 The very purpose of granting parole is to permit the convict to return to his home environment and experience the responsibilities and realities of social life. If a convict, during the period of parole, is not permitted to visit his home or reside within his native village, the obvious question that would arise is, where else would he go? The home of a person is naturally the place where his family resides and where his social roots lie. Directing a convict to reside at some unknown or unrelated place during parole would not only be impractical but would also render the grant of parole largely illusory. Parole is meant to provide the convict with an opportunity to step outside the prison walls, to interact with society and to feel the value of living as a responsible member of the community. Whe