Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation

2026 Supreme(Online)(Raj) 10504

[2026:RJ-JD:15316]

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT JODHPUR

S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 19575/2024

1. All India Institute of Medical Sciences, Jodhpur (AIIMS), through its Director, Basni, Second Phase, Jodhpur, Raj.-342005

2. All India Institute of Medical Sciences, Jodhpur (AIIMS), through its Deputy Director (Administration), Basni, Second Phase, Jodhpur, Raj.-342005

3. All India Institute of Medical Sciences, Jodhpur (AIIMS), through its Executive Director, AIIMS Jodhpur and Disciplinary Authority, Basni, Second Phase, Jodhpur, Raj.-342005

4. All India Institute of Medical Sciences, Jodhpur (AIIMS), through its President, Basni, Second Phase, Jodhpur, Raj.-342005

----Petitioners

Versus

Hansraj Sharma S/o Shri Navratan Sharma, Resident of Ugampura, Ward No. 2, Tehsil- Nokha, District Bikaner, Raj.-306401.

----Respondent

For Petitioners : Ms. Nidhi Singhvi Advocate on behalf of Mr. Deelip Kawadia Advocate.

For Respondent : Mr. Sunil Purohit Advocate.

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND SHARMA

Advocates:
For the Appellants/Petitioners: Nidhi Singhvi, Deelip Kawadia
For the Respondents: Sunil Purohit

Section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 does not create an absolute bar on legal representation; the Tribunal's discretion must ensure parity and fairness, particularly where one party utilizes an advocate under the guise of union representation, necessitating equal legal access for the opposing party to prevent manifest inequality.

Headnote:(A) Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - Section 36 - Representation of parties through legal practitioner - Whether prohibition is absolute - Principles of parity and fairness - If one party is represented by an advocate under the guise of an office bearer of a union, denying the other party the right to be represented by a legal practitioner results in manifest inequality - Tribunal’s discretion must be exercised on sound judicial principles rather than mechanical application - The court held that Section 36 does not create an absolute prohibition but confers discretion upon the Tribunal which must be exercised to maintain equity. (Paras 1, 13, 16, 19)

(B) Writ Jurisdiction - Scope of interference - Where a Tribunal fails to exercise discretion judiciously and passes a non-speaking or mechanical order resulting in prejudice and violation of principles of natural justice, the High Court is empowered to quash such an order - Parity between parties is essential for fair adjudication. (Paras 16, 22)

Facts of the case:
The respondent, a former employee, challenged his termination before the Industrial Tribunal. During these proceedings, the respondent objected to the employer's legal representation under Section 36, while the respondent himself was represented by an advocate appearing as a union office bearer. The Tribunal restrained the employer from engaging a lawyer, leading to the current petition.

Findings of Court:
The Court found that allowing one side to have professional legal representation while denying the same to the other creates a manifest imbalance and violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The Tribunal's failure to recognize the parity between the parties made the impugned order unsustainable.

Issues: Whether Section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 creates an absolute bar on engaging legal practitioners and whether a party can be denied this right when the opponent is effectively utilizing a lawyer despite the mask of union representation.

Ratio Decidendi: The statutory restriction on legal representation under Section 36 should not be interpreted to allow one party to gain an unfair advantage. Parity and equality before law require that legal representation be permitted for the employer if the workman is being represented by a trained legal professional, even if characterized as a union representative.

Result: Petition allowed; Impugned order quashed.

Judgment

REPORTABLE

Date of conclusion of arguments :: 01.04.2026

Date on which judgment was reserved :: 01.04.2026

Whether the full judgment or only the operative part is pronounced :: Full Judgment

Date of pronouncement :: 07.04.2026

1. The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioners–All India Institute of Medical Sciences assailing order dated 16.05.2024 passed by the learned Industrial Disputes Tribunal and Labour Court, Jodhpur (hereinafter to be referred as ‘the Tribunal’), whereby the application filed by the respondent-workman under Section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short ‘the Act of 1947’) has been allowed and the petitioners has been restrained from being represented through a legal practitioner.

2. Facts of the case, in brief, are that the petitioners are a statutory body constituted under the All India Institutes of Medical Sciences Act, 1956. The respondent was appointed as a Nursing Officer in the petitioners-Institute and was subsequently removed from service vide order dated 23.03.2023 after conclusion of disciplinary proceedings.

3. Aggrieved thereof, the respondent invoked Section 33-A of the Act of 1947 before the learned Tribunal, challenging the order of termination. During pendency of the said proceedings, the respondent moved an application under Section 36 of the Act of 1947 objecting to the representation of the petitioners through its Advocate, namely Mr. K.S. Yadav.

4. The learned Tribunal, vide order dated 16.05.2024, allowed the said application and restrained the petitioners from being represented by a legal practitioner. Aggrieved thereby, the present writ petition has been preferred by the petitioners.

5. Ms. Nidhi Singhvi, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the impugned order is ex facie illegal and contrary to the scheme of Section 36 of the Act of 1947, which does not impose an absolute bar on representation through legal practitioners. The respondent himself is being represented by a practicing advocate, namely Mr. Bhagirath Chandora, under the guise of an office bearer of a Union; therefore, the respondent cannot be permitted to adopt a contradictory stand.

6. The petitioners, not being an individual and rather being a statutory body, is entitled to be represented through its duly authorised counsel. However, learned Tribunal has utterly failed to appreciate that denial of legal representation to the petitioners’ results in serious prejudice and violates principles of natural justice, particularly when complex questions of law are involved.

7. Learned counsel for the petitioners, in support of her arguments, relied upon judgment of Orissa High Court in G.M, IB Valley Area, Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. vs. The P.O., Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Bhubaneswar & Ors. (MANU/ OR/ 0970/2017) and judgment of Bombay High Court in the case of T.K. Varghese vs. Nichimen Corporation (MANU/MH/0414/2001).

8. Per contra, Mr. Sunil Purohit, learned counsel for the respondent, while vehemently opposing the writ petition, submitted that the writ petition deserves dismissal on account of being wholly misconceived. Section 36 of the Act of 1947 clearly restricts representation through legal practitioners unless consent of the opposite party and leave of the Tribunal is obtained.

9. Mr. Purohit further submitted that the respondent is not represented by a legal practitioner in his professional capacity; rather, his representative is an office bearer of the Union, which is permissible under Section 36(1) of the Act of 1947. The petitioners’ request to have representation before the Tribunal through an advocate was in direct contravention to the legal provision, which was rightly disallowed by the Tribunal. The impugned order is well reasoned and does not warrant interference in writ jurisdiction.

10. Learned counsel for the respondent, in order to support

Click Here to Read the rest of this document

2026 Supreme(Online)(Raj) 10504

Cases Referred (1)