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2022 Supreme(Online)(SC) 762
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Not specified, J
TAHIR V. ISANI – Appellant
Versus
MADAN WAMAN CHODANKAR (SINCE DECEASED) NOW THROUGH HIS LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES & ORS. – Respondent
CIVIL APPEAL NO………………….OF 2025| SLP(C) NO.15167 OF 2022
For the Appellants/Petitioners: Not specified
For the Respondents: Not specified
The court ruled that a bona fide purchaser during litigation can contest execution without being restricted by the doctrine of lis pendens.
Headnote:(A) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order XXI Rules 97 and 101 - The doctrine of lis pendens - The court reaffirmed the principles governing the applicability of Rule 102, emphasizing that purchasers during the pendency of a suit cannot resist decree execution. (Paras 9, 10, 15)
(B) Doctrine of Lis Pendens - The court noted that a transferee of a judgment-debtor cannot claim protection under Rules 98 and 100 if the transfer was made after suit initiation. (Paras 12, 26)
Facts of the case:
The dispute involved the execution of a decree concerning property ownership, where the appellant's purchase occurred during ongoing litigation, raising issues of procedural rights under the CPC.
Findings of Court:
The High Court's decision was erroneous, misapplying provisions concerning transferee rights under Order XXI of the CPC, and the Executing Court was directed to continue proceedings.
Issues: The core issues included the applicability of Rule 102 concerning the rights of property purchasers during ongoing litigation.
Ratio Decidendi: The court found that the appellant, a bona fide buyer, was not subject to the restrictions posed by Rule 102 because he did not derive title from the judgment-debtor.
Result: Appeal allowed.
The legal document pertains to a dispute involving the execution of a decree related to property rights, where the core issue is whether a bona fide purchaser during ongoing litigation can contest the execution of a decree without being restricted by the doctrine of lis pendens. The court reaffirmed that a transferee who acquires property from a third party, not the judgment-debtor, during the pendency of a suit, is not barred from raising objections under Order XXI Rules 97 and 101 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) (!) (!) (!) .
The court clarified that the doctrine of lis pendens primarily protects the interests of decree-holders by preventing the transfer of property that is subject to litigation, thereby ensuring finality of judgments. However, this doctrine does not extend to bona fide purchasers who acquire property from a third party not involved in the pending suit, especially if the transfer occurred prior to the judgment or decree (!) (!) (!) .
In the case at hand, the appellant, who purchased the property from a third party (the owner M/s Rizvi Estate and Hotels Pvt. Ltd.) after the original suit and decree, was deemed a bona fide purchaser. The appellant's purchase was not made from the judgment-debtor or a party to the suit, and thus, Rule 102 of Order XXI did not bar him from raising objections to the execution proceedings (!) (!) (!) .
The court emphasized that the application of Rule 102 is limited to transferees who trace their title directly from the judgment-debtor during the pendency of the suit. Since the appellant's transfer was from a third-party owner and prior to the suit's final judgment, he was entitled to participate in the execution proceedings and raise objections under Rules 97 and 101 (!) (!) .
Ultimately, the court set aside the order of the High Court that had dismissed the appellant's objections and directed the executing court to proceed with the enquiry, considering the appellant's rights as a bona fide purchaser. The decision underscores that protections under the doctrine of lis pendens and Rule 102 are not absolute and are limited to specific circumstances involving direct transfers from the judgment-debtor during litigation.
| Table of Content |
|---|
| 1. ownership and lease details. (Para 3) |
| 2. court findings on the applicability of cpc. (Para 6 , 7 , 8) |
| 3. interpretation of rule 102 of cpc. (Para 9 , 10) |
| 4. discussion on doctrine of lis pendens. (Para 11 , 12) |
| 5. appellant's standing as a bona fide purchaser. (Para 13 , 14) |
| 6. final direction regarding the execution proceedings. (Para 15 , 16) |
ORDER
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal assails the correctness of judgment and order dated 25th July, 2022, passed by the High Court of Bombay at Goa,, Hereinafter, referred to as ‘High Court’ [REPORTABLE] in Writ Petition No.86 of 2022, whereby the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition, and after setting aside
3. Relevant facts necessary for adjudication of the present appeal are as under: -
3.1 Mrs. Maria Eduardo Apolina Gonsalves Misquita was the owner of plot of land measuring 477 square meters with a two-floor building ground + first standing thereon registered at No.1624, Book No.B(5)(new), page-156 (reverse) in the Land Registration Office, Panaji bearing Matriz No.958.
3.2 A part of the aforesaid property on the ground floor, measuring 123 square meters with plinth area and approximately 89.78 square meters area of building, was leased out on rent to Madan Waman Chodankar (respondent no.1), vide deed dated 22nd February, 1977.
3.3 Later on, respondent no.1 entered into a partnership on 13th March, 1977 with Dyaneshwar Keshav Malik and others (‘Maliks’) for setting up a hardware business and other allied products. The business of the said firm was to be carried out from a portion of the aforesaid leased premises. However, the tenancy as per the partnership was to continue with respondent no.1.
3.4 The original owner, Mrs. Misquita, vide registered sale deed dated 16th January, 1988, sold the entire property to M/s. Rizvi Estate and Hotels Pvt. Ltd. Thereafter, an agreement was executed between the purchaser, M/s. Rizvi Estate and Hotels Pvt. Ltd and the Maliks (sub- lessee) for surrendering the possession in order to enable the purchaser to demolish the building, construct a new multi-storied building and thereafter provide space to the sub-lessee upon construction of the new building and in the meantime provide alternate space to the sub- lessee. In the said document of 16th April, 1988 respondent no.1 was a confirming party.
3.5 Respondent no.1 filed a Regular Civil Suit No.112/88/C for injunction against M/s. Rizvi Estate and Hotels Pvt. Ltd. as they sought to demolish portion of the building apparently in the light of the agreement dated 16th April, 1988. In 1989, M/s. Rizvi Estate and Hotels Pvt. Ltd. preferred an application for eviction of respondent no.1 before the Court of Rent Controller being Rent Case No.17 of 1989 alleging that there has been sub-letting by respondent no.1 to Maliks, which was contrary to the lease deed dated 22nd February, 1977.
3.6 In 1996, respondent no.1 filed a Special Civil Suit No.97/1996/B against Maliks for dissolution of partnership, recovery of profit and ejectment. The written statement filed by Maliks in the said suit clearly stated that all parties had surrendered their rights in favour of M/s. Rizvi Estate and Hotels Pvt. Ltd. on 11th April, 1988.
3.7 Meanwhile, the Court of Civil Judge, Jr. Division, vide judgment dated 22nd July, 1999, decreed the injunction suit filed by respondent no.1 and restrained M/s. Rizvi Estate and Hotels Pvt. Ltd. from demolishing the building. The decree and judgment of the Civil Judge was carried in appeal by way of Regular Civil Appeal No.91/99, which was dismissed, vide order dated 24th December, 2001.
3.8 M/s. Rizvi Estate a
