Exhaustion of statutory remedies is generally required before invoking writ jurisdiction, unless exceptional circumstances justify deviation.

JUDGMENT

1. This civil appeal, by special leave granted on 17^th September, 2012, impugns the judgment and order dated 14^th March, 2011, [REPORTABLE] of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Bench at Jaipur, [], whereby the appellant’s writ petition, [D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 6203 of 2009] came to be dismissed on the ground of omission of the appellant to pursue the alternative remedy of appeal provided by the Customs Act, 1962 , [1962 Act] as well as on merits.

2. The facts leading to presentation of the writ petition before the High Court are not in dispute. On 27^th September, 1992, alleged smuggled silver weighing 252.177 kgs came to be seized. By an order dated 7^th May, 1996, the respondent no. 3, Commissioner, Customs and Central Excise ordered confiscation of the seized silver and levied penalty of Rs.50,000/- on the appellant. The said order was carried in appeal, [Appeal No. C/225/96 NB] by the appellant before the CEGAT, [Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal] under Section 129A (1) of the 1962 Act. The CEGAT effectively dismissed the appeal by an order dated 23^rd June, 2000. While it did not interfere with the order of confiscation, the amount of penalty was reduced to Rs.30,000/-.

3. Despite availability of a further appeal to the High Court under Section 130 of the Customs Act, the order dated 23^rd June, 2000 of dismissal of the appeal by the CEGAT was not challenged by the appellant within the prescribed period of limitation, i.e., 180 days. Instead, the appellant approached the High Court in its writ jurisdiction as late as on 18^th March, 2003. Therein, he laid a challenge to the order dated 7^th May, 1996 of the respondent no.3 and the order dated 23^rd June, 2000 of the CEGAT.

4. Perusal of the impugned order reveals that the High Court did not examine the order of confiscation on its merits forming a view that such an order had not been challenged by the appellant before the CEGAT. The High Court held that since the appellant did not challenge the confiscation order before the CEGAT (but only challenged the order of penalty), the order of the CEGAT had attained finality. Therefore, the only remedy available to the appellant was to file an appeal under Section 130A of the Act, which he did not pursue. Thus, the High Court declined to invoke its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. One other reason was assigned by the High Court for holding that the appellant did not deserve relief. The High Court noted that the order dated 14^th May, 2003 of the criminal revisional court (the court of the Additional Sessions Judge), which set aside the Special Magistrate’s direction contained in an order dated 12^th February, 2002 to return the seized silver, was never challenged by the appellant. In effect, when there was no order directing return of silver, the appellant could not have asked for the relief in a writ petition.

5. We have heard Ms. Chitrangda Rastravara, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Raghavendra P. Shankar, learned Additional Solicitor General for the respondents at some length.

6. Since the appellant has been told off at the gates by the High Court on the ground that he did not pursue the alternative remedy of appeal before the High Court under Section 130 of the 1962 Act, what is central to our consideration is whether the High Court was justified in refusing to entertain the writ petition of the appellant seeking a writ of certiorari.

7. Decisions of this Court are legion from which guidance can aptly