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1997 Supreme(Online)(SC) 17

SUPREME COURT
K. Ramaswamy, J
M/s. Anamallai Club v. Govt. of T. N. and Others
Writ Appeal No. 1055 of 1992



Advocates:
For the Appellants/Petitioners: Shri Soli J. Sorabjee
For the Respondents: Shri Krishnamurthy

State cannot unilaterally resume possession without following legal procedures post-termination of license.

Headnote:The Supreme Court reviews the controversial termination of a license under the Government Grants Act, 1895, and emphasizes that unilateral possession resumption by the State without legal procedures is invalid. It finds that the High Court incorrectly upheld the termination without proper compliance with prescribed eviction procedures. The judgment reiterates the legal principle of due process in property dispossession matters. The Court concludes that although the license was terminated, the State failed to follow lawful eviction protocols.

1 Leave granted.

2 This appeal by special leave arises from the Division Bench Judgment of Madras High Court dated September 24, 1993, made in Writ Appeal No. 1055 of 1992.

3 The undisputed facts are that the appellant was granted licence in respect of an extent of 28.70 acres of Government land in Anamalai, Valparai Taluk of Coimbatore District for sports and recreation purposes. Notice was issued on May 22, 1992, terminating the licence under S.3 of the Government Grants Act, 1895 (for short, the 'Act') which was served on its Secretary on May 23, 1992; the land was resumed and the possession thereof was taken with the assistance of the police personnel on the even date. The appellant's writ petition was allowed by the learned single Judge by his order dated August 17, 1992 in Writ Petition No. 7160/92 and giving directions therein. Feeling aggrieved, the respondent-State filed the appeal and the Division Bench in the impugned Judgment while upholding the termination of the licence under the Act, recorded a finding that "there is no legal impediment at all for resumption of possession of the lands by the Government, without seeking any aid of the provisions of the PPE Act, after the determination of the grant in the manner provided in the grant itself."

4 Shri Soli J. Sorabjee, learned senior counsel, contended that even assuming that the termination of the grant was in accordance with the grant itself, as found by the Division Bench of the High Court, resumption of the possession without giving an opportunity to the appellant and following the procedure prescribed under the Tamil Nadu Public Premises Act (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1975 (for short, the 'Eviction Act') is unauthorised and unwarranted. The finding of the Division Bench is, therefore, clearly unsustainable in law. Shri Krishnamurthy, learned counsel for the State, contended that the right of the appellant flows from the grant under which they came into possession. After determination of the grant by issuance of the notice in terms of the grant itself, the appellants thereafter have no right to remain in possession. Therefore, the resumption of the possession by the respondents in terms of the grant is valid in law. In that situation, the need to take recourse to the provisions of the Eviction Act bears no relevance and need not be followed.

5 The question is : whether the resumption of possession unilaterally after determination of the grant in the manner provided under the grant itself, is valid in law as was held by the High Court? We think that the view taken by the High Court is not correct in law. In Bishan Das v. State of Punjab , AIR 1961 SC 1570 , a Constitution Bench of this Court had considered the question whether the Government would unilaterally take possession of the land after termination of the lease. One Ramjidas had built a dharamsala, a temple and shops appurtenant thereto, after having a licence of land from the State Government. The lease was terminated and thereafter when the persons in possession were sought to be dispossessed, without taking any recourse to law, they filed writ petition under Art.226 but remained unsuccessful. When writ petition under Art.32 was filed, this Court had considered the question whether the Government is entitled to resume the land with a minimum use of force for ejectment without recourse to law. It was contended therein that there was no dispute as to the question of fact between the parties that the petitioners therein had no right and title to the subject matter in dispute. The writ petition under Art.226 was dismissed on the ground of the disputed question of fact which was upheld in appeal by the Division Bench. A writ petition under Art.32 was filed. The right to possession of land was a fundamental right at that time. It was contended that the Government terminated the lease, as thereafter they were trespassers and so they had no right to resist the Government's power to resume the land.












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