Condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act requires a cogent, continuous, and credible explanation showing 'sufficient cause'. Courts cannot adopt a liberal approach to condone inordinate, unexplained, and gross negligence, as public policy demands finality to litigation.

JUDGMENT

Heard Sri K.P.Anudeep Kumar, learned counsel representing Sri S.S.R.Murthy, learned counsel for the appellants and perused the record.

2. I.A.No.1 of 2023 is filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, seeking condonation of a delay of 6918 days by the appellants/petitioners in filing the present appeal against the judgment and decree dated 22.10.2003 passed by the Family Court Judge at Hyderabad in O.S.No.75 of 2001. The said suit was instituted by the appellants seeking a declaration that appellant No.1 is the legally wedded wife of late N. Yadagiri and that appellant Nos.2 to 4 are his legal heirs, along with a consequential permanent injunction restraining the respondents from releasing the service benefits of the deceased to respondent No.3, which came to be dismissed on 22.10.2003.

3. The appellants in A.S.No.16 of 2023; the petitioners in I.A.No.1 of 2023 and plaintiffs in O.S.No.75 of 2001 are one and the same.

4. The grounds of the appellants/petitioners as set out in I.A.No.1 of 2023 seeking condonation of the inordinate delay, is set forth as under:

i) The petitioner No.1 is an uneducated, illiterate, and economically indigent woman belonging to a downtrodden section of society, who had no awareness of legal proceedings and was financially incapable of bearing legal expenses or effectively prosecuting the matter.

ii) At the time of institution of the suit in the year 2001, the petitioner No.1 had engaged a counsel to represent her before the Family Court, Hyderabad. However, upon dismissal of the suit on 22.10.2003, no intimation whatsoever was received by her either from the engaged counsel or from the Court, who thereby remained under the bona fide impression that her counsel would duly inform her of the status of the case or that petitioner No.1 would receive notice from the Court in due course.

iii) The petitioner No.1 averred that she made several visits to the City Civil Court complex in an attempt to trace her counsel and ascertain the status of the case. However, owing to her illiteracy and inability to either identify or recall the name of the counsel, coupled with severe financial constraints, she could not effectively pursue the matter any further.

iv) It is specifically pleaded that the petitioners came to know about the dismissal of the suit only on 24.10.2022, when the petitioner No.1 approached the concerned authorities seeking release of the terminal/death benefits of her deceased husband and was then informed that the suit filed by her had already been dismissed.

v) Thereafter, the petitioners applied for a certified copy of the judgment and decree on 25.10.2022, which was made ready and delivered on 11.11.2022. Upon obtaining legal advice thereafter, the present appeal came to be filed on 29.12.2022.

5. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants/petitioners in support of the condonation application has advanced the following submissions:

i. That the provisions of the Limitation Act are procedural in nature and are intended to advance, and not obstruct, the cause of justice. The Courts have consistently adopted a liberal approach in condoning delay, particularly where the litigant is an illiterate, economically disadvantaged widow with dependent children. It is urged that Section 5 of the Limitation Act must be construed in a manner that subserves substantial justice rather than defeating it on technicalities.

ii. That the petitioners have not derived any benefit from the delay; on the contrary, they have been deprived of their lawful entitlements for nearly two decades. There is neither mala fide intent nor deliberate inaction. The delay is attributable to factors such as illiteracy, poverty, lack of legal awareness, and absence of proper legal assistance, all of which constitute “sufficient cause” within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

iii. That the trial Court dismissed the suit not upon a comprehensive evaluation of the rival claims on merits, but primarily