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HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN - PRINCIPAL SEAT AT JODHP
H.R. Panwar, J
Urban Improvement Trust, Bikaner – Appellant
Versus
Gordhan Dass – Respondent
SBCSA NO. 114/2004
For the Appellants/Petitioners: B.R.Mehta
For the Respondents: Sridhar Purohit, R.K.Thanvi
A suit for permanent injunction is maintainable without a prayer for declaration of title if the plaintiff proves possession based on a valid registered sale deed and the defendant admits such title. Civil courts retain jurisdiction when acquisition proceedings are challenged as void ab initio for lack of notice.
Headnote:(A) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 9 - Urban Improvement Trust Act, 1959 - Section 52 - Suit for permanent injunction - Maintainability - Whether a suit for permanent injunction is maintainable without seeking a declaration of title - The Court held that if the title is not disputed and the plaintiff is in peaceful possession based on a registered sale deed, a suit for bare injunction is maintainable. (Paragraphs 19, 20, 24)
(B) Jurisdictional Ouster - The Court held that civil courts have jurisdiction where the challenged state action is shown to be void ab initio, such as land acquisition proceedings conducted without notice to the true owner who purchased the land years before the notification. (Paragraphs 22, 23)
Facts of the case:
Respondent purchased land through registered sale deeds in March 1970. The appellant, a statutory trust, sought to interfere with the possession of this land, claiming it was subject to acquisition proceedings initiated in 1972. The plaintiff argued the acquisition was void due to a lack of notice to the titleholder. The trial court decreed the suit in part, which was later upheld by the first appellate court.
Findings of Court:
In instances where the defendant admits the possession and title of the plaintiff, formal prayer for declaration of title is not a prerequisite for a permanent injunction. Furthermore, the court held that land acquisition proceedings initiated without mandatory notice to the proper owner are nullities, thereby vesting jurisdiction in the Civil Court.
Issues: Whether a suit for bare injunction is maintainable without a prayer for declaration of title and whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain a challenge against acquisition proceedings under the Act of 1959.
Ratio Decidendi: An owner in possession established by a registered sale deed is entitled to a permanent injunction when the defendant has no superior title. Where an acquisition proceeding violates fundamental due process (lack of notice), it constitutes a void act over which the Civil Court retains jurisdiction despite statutory finality clauses.
Result: Appeal dismissed.
The legal document indicates that the land in question was purchased by the plaintiff and respondents through registered sale deeds prior to any acquisition proceedings. The document emphasizes that the land was in their lawful possession and that their title was not disputed by the appellant. It also notes that the acquisition proceedings under Section 52 of the relevant Act of 1959 were initiated after the land was already purchased and in possession of the respondents, and that such proceedings lacked proper notice to the true owner, rendering them void and null in the absence of such notice (!) [p__].
Furthermore, the document clarifies that the land was acquired by the appellant through payment of compensation to the khatedars, but the proceedings were initiated without notice to the actual landowners who had purchased the land earlier. The acquisition process, therefore, is considered null and void due to the absence of proper notice, which is a fundamental requirement in land acquisition law (!) (!) .
In terms of land revenue aspects, the document underscores that the possession and title of the respondents, supported by registered sale deeds and entries in revenue records, establish their legitimate rights over the land. The entries in revenue records, such as khasra entries, also support the possession of the respondents and their predecessors, and the land's use for non-agricultural purposes (e.g., installing a petroleum outlet) has been recognized and permitted by the authorities (!) (!) .
Overall, the land revenue aspect in this case hinges on the fact that the respondents' possession and title are well-established through registered documents and revenue record entries, and that the acquisition proceedings were invalid due to lack of proper notice, making the respondents' possession and rights over the land legally valid and protected.
BY THE COURT
Reportable
This civil second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short 'the Code' hereinafter) is directed against the judgment and decree dated 16.4.2004 passed by District Judge, Bikaner (for short 'the first appellate court' hereinafter) in Appeal Decree No.30/04 whereby the appeal filed by plaintiff respondent Gordhan Dass came to be allowed and a decree of permanent injunction in favour of plaintiff respondent Gordhan Dass and against the appellant defendant Urban Improvement Trust, Bikaner (for short 'the UIT' hereinafter) was passed. Hence this second appeal by the appellant defendant UIT.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties. Carefully gone through the judgment and decree of the first appellate court as also the judgment and decree dated 23.2.2004 passed by Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), No.1, Bikaner (for short 'the trial court' hereinafter) in Civil Original Suit No.3/04 whereby the suit filed by plaintiff respondent Gordhan Dass was partly decreed in respect of land bearing Khasra No.284/83.
It is contended by learned counsel for the appellant that merely suit for permanent injunction is not maintainable unless a relief for declaration of title is sought. It is further contended that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the suit when the land for which the permanent injunction was sought by the plaintiff respondent was subject matter of the acquisition under the provisions of Section 52 of the Urban Improvement Trust Act, 1959 (for short “the Act of 1959” hereinafter). It was also contended that the suit as such was not maintainable in absence of the State being a party to the suit. According to learned counsel for the appellant, the plaintiff respondent failed to implead the State as party respondent and therefore, the suit is not maintainable for want of necessary party.
Learned counsel appearing for the respondents supported the judgment and decree impugned and contended that the plaintiff respondent filed the suit for injunction on the basis of his possession over the disputed land through a registered sale deed and therefore, there is no requirement for seeking relief of declaration of title. It was further contended that the registered sale deed carries presumption of genuineness and suit has been based by the plaintiff on the registered sale deed in his favour coupled with his possession and therefore, the suit simplicitor for permanent injunction is maintainable on the facts and circumstances of the case.
Mr. R.K.Thanvi, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.2 has relied on decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Corporation of the City of Bangalore Vs. M. Papaiah and another AIR 1989 SC 1809. Learned counsel for the respondent has further relied on decisions in P. Buchi Reddy and Ors. Vs. Ananthula Sudhakar 1999 (suppl.) Civil Court Cases, 57 (A.P.), in Govind Anant Goltekar and Ors. Vs. Dasharath Deoba Goltekar, AIR 2006 Bombay, 174 and a Division Bench decision of Bombay High Court in Smt. Yeshwanti Shrirang Pai and Ors. Vs. Smt. Sunita Waman Pai, AIR 2006 Bombay, 289.
Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has relied on decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.P.Subramanya Shetty and Others Vs. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation and Others, AIR 1997 SC 2076 on the point of jurisdiction of Civil Court and in Pratap and another Vs. State of Rajasthan and Others AIR 1996 SC 1296 as also in U.P.Jal Nigam, Lucknow through its Chairman and another Vs. M/s. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd. Lucknow and Others, AIR 1996 SC 1170.
Mr. Sridhar Purohit counsel for the respondent No.1 has also relied on decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in U.P. Jal Nigam, Lucknow and another Vs. M/s. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd. (supra).
So far as the contention raised by learned counsel for the appellant that a Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit in respect of the land which was subject matter of acquisition under Section 52 of the Ac
