A claim must disclose a reasonable cause of action with sufficient particulars; otherwise, it is subject to being struck out. Conceding the absence of cause but pursuing an appeal constitutes an abuse of process.

[1] This Court heard Encl 10 and Enclosure 11 on 17 January 2025, which were applications by the 3th, 4th, 5th, and 6th Defendants to strike out the Plaintiffs Statement of Claim (SoC) pursuant to O 18 r 19(1)(a) of the Rules of Court 2012 (RoC) and/or the inherent jurisdiction of the Court.

[2] At the hearing, counsel for the Plaintiff expressly confirmed that the Plaintiff had no cause of action against the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Defendants. This admission was unequivocal and made to this Court. Notwithstanding this clear concession, the Plaintiff proceeded to maintain its claim and subsequently lodged an appeal against this Court's decision.

[3] This course of action by the Plaintiff, in pursuing an appeal when it had already conceded the absence of a cause of action, constitutes an abuse of the Court process and a waste of judicial resources. While parties are entitled to exhaust their legal remedies, the courts must guard against frivolous litigation that serves no legitimate purpose other than to burden the legal system. Be that as it may, the following are this Court's findings.

Findings

[4] The applications to strike out were premised on the following grounds:

(a) The Plaintiffs claim did not disclose a reasonable cause of action against the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Defendants;

(b) There were no material facts pleaded to sustain a claim against these Defendants;

(c) No privity of contract existed between the Plaintiff and these Defendants;

(d) The Plaintiff itself pleaded that the 4th Defendant acted only as legal counsel for the 1st and 2nd Defendants;

(e) There were no allegations in the SoC that would justify piercing the corporate veil in respect of the 3rd Defendant;

(f) The Plaintiff failed to plead any wrongdoing on the part of the 5th and 6th Defendants that would warrant them being sued in this action.

[5] A detailed review of the SoC revealed that the Plaintiffs case against the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Defendants was entirely unsustainable. As the applications were under limb (a), this Court considered in-dept the Plaintiffs pleadings - the ruling by the Federal Court in New Straits Times (Malaysia) Bhd v. Kumpulan Kertas Niaga Sdn Bhd & Anor [1984] 1 MLRA 771; 1985 MarsdenLR 824 is instructive. The Plaintiffs allegations against the 3rd Defendant, as pleaded in paragraphs 23 to 26 of the SoC, do not disclose any direct liability. The Plaintiff merely named him as a party without demonstrating his personal role in any wrongdoing. There were no averments or specific allegations of wrongdoing justifying the lifting of the corporate veil. The Plaintiff did not plead any actionable misconduct that would justify a claim against the 3rd Defendant personally.

[6] With respect to the 4th Defendant, the Plaintiffs own pleadings in paragraphs 27 to 30 explicitly acknowledged that the firm acted strictly as legal counsel for the 1st and 2nd Defendants. No claim of professional negligence, misconduct, or breach of duty was made against the firm. The doctrine of advocate immunity and the absence of any actionable breach precluded any claim against the 4th Defendant. Furthermore, the Plaintiff did not plead any exception that would allow a claim against a solicitor representing a client in the ordinary course of legal practice.

[7] The claims against the 5th and 6th Defendants, as stated in paragraphs 31 to 35, were vague and unsubstantiated. The SoC lacked specificity and the Plaintiff did not establish any contractual relationship with these entities nor any specific acts of wrongdoing. The Plaintiffs SoC did not attribute any independent acts of wrongdoing to these Defendants. Instead, their inclusion in the claim appeared to be speculative, unsupported by