The limitation period for breach of contract actions commences when the breach occurs, not when damage is suffered.

[14] With respect, we disagree with the submission of the plaintiff. The plaintiff's claims against the 1st defendant in the present action was based on contract which must be filed in COURT within the period of six years from the date of the accrual of the cause of action as provided for under s 6(1) of Act 254. A 'cause of action' has been defined as "every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the COURT". (See Read v. Brown [1888] 22 QBD 128, 131).

[15] The general rule in contract is the cause of action accrues not when the damage is suffered but when the breach occurred. Consequently, the limitation period runs from the time the contract is breached and not from the time that the resulting damage is sustained by the plaintiff.

[16] In Nasri v. Mesah , 1970 MarsdenLR 308 , the Federal COURT per Gill FJ enunciated on the "date of accrual in the case of debt" as follows:

"This expression, 'cause of action', has been repeatedly the subject of decision, and it has been held, particularly in Hemp v. Garland LR 4 QB 509 511, decided in 1843, that the cause of action arises at the time when the debt could first have been recovered by action. The right to bring an action may arise on various events; but it has always been held that the statute runs from the earliest time at which an action could be brought."

In Board of Trade v. Cayzer, Irvine & Co [1927] AC 610 617. Viscount Dunedin described "cause of action" as that which makes action possible. Now, what makes possible an action founded on a contract is its breach. In other words, a cause of action founded on a contract accrues on the date of its breach. Similarly, the right to sue on a contract accrues on its breach. In the case of actions founded on contract, therefore, time runs from breach (per Field J in Gibbs v. Guild) 8 QBD 296 302. In the case of actions founded on any other right, time runs from the date on which that right is infringed or there is a threat of its infringement (see Bolo's case LR 57 IA 74). It would seem clear, therefore, that the expressions "the right to sue accrues", "the cause of action accrues" and "the right of action accrues" mean one and the same thing when one speaks of the time from which the period of limitation as prescribed by law should run.". (Emphasis added).

(See also Loh Wai Lian v. SEA Housing Corporation Sdn Bhd, [1984] 2 MLJ 280; Insun Development Sdn Bhd v. Azali bin Bakar; [1996] 2 MLJ 188; [1996] 2 CLJ 753; [1996] 2 AMR 1921; The Great Eastern Life Assurance Co Ltd v. Indra Janardhana Menon (representing the estate of the deceased, NVJ Menon); [2006] 2 MLJ 209; [2005] 4 CLJ 717; [2006] 1 AMR 1 and Tenaga Nasional Berhad v. Kamarstone Sdn Bhd; [2014] 1 MLJ 391; [2014] 1 CLJ 207; [2014] 1 AMR 522 (FC)).

[17] Three different reasons have been advanced by the Courts to explain the purpose of limitation statutes. The first reason is that a plaintiff with a good cause of action should pursue it with reasonable diligence. The second one is that a defendant might have lost evidence to disprove a stale claim. The third reason is that long dormant claims have more cruelty than justice in them (See Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th edn, para 605 at p 266).

[18] In RB Policies At Lloyd's v. Butler [1950] 1 KB 76: [1949] 2 All ER 226 (KBD) Streatfeild J stated that "one of the principles of the Limitation Act 1939 is that those who go to sleep on their claims should not be assisted by the courts in recovering their property. But another equally important principle is that there shall be an end to these matters and that there shall be protection against stale demands".

[19] Further, in Board of Trade v. Cayzer, Irvine and Co Limite