2000 MarsdenLR 324
LAMIN MOHD YUNUS, NH CHAN, HAIDAR MOHD NOOR
GANESAN NACHIAPPAN – Appellant
Versus
PP – Respondent
For the appellant - Karpal Singh; M/s Karpal Singh & Co For the respondent - K Muniandy DPPCriminal Appeal No:J-05-40-97 For the appellant - K Muniandy DPP For the respondent - Karpal Singh; M/s Karpal Singh & Co[Appeal from High Court, Johor Bahru; Criminal Trial No: 45-13-1996]
The appellate court upheld the sentencing discretion of the trial judge, finding it appropriate in light of the offences' severity.
Headnote:The appellants were charged under sections 302 and 304 of the Penal Code; they pleaded guilty to the amended charge. The trial judge imposed a fourteen-year sentence considering their pleas and maturity. The court found no error in sentencing discretion and dismissed the appeal. The cross-appeal by the Public Prosecutor was also dismissed as the sentence was deemed adequate.
Haidar Mohd Noor JCA:
All the six appellants were originally charged for an offence under s. 302 of the Penal Code read with s. 34 of the . Midway through the prosecution case, the learned deputy public prosecutor amended the charge to one under s. 304 (1st limb) read with s. 34 of the . All the appellants pleaded guilty to the amended charge (exh. P51) after they understood the nature and consequences of their pleas. The facts of the case were presented by the learned deputy public prosecutor (exh. P52). All of them admitted to the correctness of the facts.
After hearing the mitigation put forward by their respective counsel the learned judge sentenced each of them to fourteen years' imprisonment to take effect from the date of their respective arrest.
The appeal is in respect of their sentence only. There is a cross-appeal by the Public Prosecutor against their sentence.
As the appeal is against sentence and the facts are fully stated in exh. P52 (pp. 358 to 361 of the appeal record) we do not propose to set them out here.
The power of sentencing given to a trial court is a discretionary one and in order for us, as the appellate court, to disturb the sentence imposed, we must be convinced that the trial judge had erred in applying the correct principles of sentencing or had embarked on some unauthorised or extraneous exercise of discretion (see PP v. Loo Choon Fatt and Bhandulananda Jayatilake v. PP ).
The learned judge in his judgment had given due consideration, inter alia, to the plea of guilty, the ages of the appellants and the period they were remanded before passing the sentence on them (p. 263 of the appeal record). As regards the ages of the appellants and their lack of maturity in committing the offence, this is what the learned judge said at p. 205 of the appeal record:
Peguam-peguam yang mewakili mereka masing-masing telah membuat rayuan meringankan hukuman dan di antara faktor yang diutamakan bagi tujuan ini adalah mereka masih muda pada hari kejadian itu dan tidak berfikir secara matang atas perbuatan mereka. Mengenai faktor ini, saya berpendapat tindakan mereka menetak simati tidak menunjukkan mereka kurang matang pada hari kejadian itu. Mereka telah pergi ke rumah simati dengan membawa senjata dan telah bersedia untuk menggunakan kekerasan ke atasnya.
Kesan-kesan luka tetakan pada badan simati, yang mana menurut laporan bedah siasat berjumlah 45, menggambarkan mereka mempunyai sikap penjenayah yang bersedia mengganas dan tidak berperikemanusiaan.
Di samping itu saya mendapat, memandangkan kesalahan ini telah dilakukan bersama-sama, ini menunjukkan mereka telah membuat rancangan sebelum melakukannya.
The injuries inflicted on the deceased were serious. There were altogether 45 stab wounds. The gory photographs at pp. 285 to 288 of the appeal record clearly showed the seriousness of the injuries. The deceased was badly disfigured. The learned judge was therefore right to take into account the public interest element in view of the seriousness of the offence committed by the appellants.
In our view, the learned judge had properly exercised his discretion in imposing the sentence and there were no grounds for us to interfere with it. The sentence was not manifestly excessive given the facts of the case and the serious injuries. The appeal was therefore dismissed and we affirmed the sentence.
As regards the cross-appeal by the Public Prosecutor, we were of the opinion that the sentence imposed is not manifestly inadequate for the reason that the learned judge had properly exercised his discretion and he had taken into account the interests of the appellants and balanced them with the public interest. In the circumstances we should not disturb the sentence imposed. The cross-appeal was accordingly dismissed.
.