The enforcement of a foreign judgment should not be set aside on public policy grounds unless it violates fundamental principles of justice or morals, adhering to a restrictive interpretation of public policy.

Wong Kian Kheong JCA:

A. Introduction

[1] This appeal concerns the court's power under s 5(1)(a)(v) of the Registration and Enforcement of Judgments Act 1958 (REJA) to set aside the registration of a judgment of the Singapore High court on the ground that the enforcement of the judgment would be contrary to public policy in Malaysia.?

B. Background

B(1). The Motor Insurers' Bureaus In West Malaysia And Singapore

[2] The appellant (Appellant) is a non-profit organisation in Singapore which operates a scheme funded by all general insurance companies and Lloyd's Underwriters transacting compulsory motor vehicle insurance business in Singapore. The Appellant's primary function is to ensure that victims of road traffic accidents have recourse when-

(1) the driver of a motor vehicle who injures a victim cannot be traced; or

(2) the driver of a motor vehicle who injures a victim is without effective insurance to cover his/her liability and is therefore unable to compensate the victim.

[3] The Appellant carries on the same function as "Motor Insurance Bureau of West Malaysia" in West Malaysia (MIBWM). MIBWM is likewise a non-profit organisation funded by all general insurance companies in West Malaysia and insurance companies transacting compulsory motor vehicle insurance business in West Malaysia.

[4] To give effect to its functions and framework, the Appellant and MIBWM, in Singapore and West Malaysia respectively, had each entered into similar arrangements governing compensation of third party victims of road accident in their respective countries. These arrangements are known as the "Principal Agreement' and "Domestic Agreements

align="center">Appellant's Contractual Framework in Singapore

align="center">MIBWM's Contractual Framework in West Malaysia

[5] To compel Singapore motor-insurance companies transacting motor insurance in West Malaysia to comply with local Malaysian laws, Singapore insurers entered into "special agreements" with MIBWM. This arrangement also applies in Singapore between the Appellant and the respondent insurance company (Respondent).

[6] Following the Singapore Domestic Agreement, Malaysian insurance companies transacting motor-insurance in Singapore executed contracts known as "special agreements" with the Appellant. One such special agreement is the special agreement dated 15 September 1975 between the Appellant and Respondent (Special Agreement).

[7] According to cl 2 of the Special Agreement, the Respondent agreed to be bound by the Singapore Domestic Agreement. Reproduced below is cl 2 of the Special Agreement:

"The [Respondent] further covenants with the [Appellant] that it will comply with every obligation imposed upon the Members of the Bureau by the [Singapore Domestic Agreement] between the [Appellant] and the Members (a copy whereof is annexed hereto) in every way as if the [Respondent] were an "insurer" for the purpose of the said [Singapore Domestic Agreement] and in particular undertakes and binds itself to the [Appellant] to make any payment demanded under cls 6 and 7 of the said [Singapore Domestic Agreement] and to furnish the Council of the [Appellant] such particulars or its premium income as the Council may require "

(emphasis added).

[8] Clause 1 of the Singapore Domestic Agreement has defined "Compulsory Insurance Legislation" as follows:

" "Compulsory Insurance Legislation" means the Motor Vehicles (Third-Party Risks and Compensation) Act (Chapter 88) and any statutory modifications thereto or any re-enactments thereof"

(emphasis added).

[9] According to cl 3 of Singapore Domestic Agreement-

"If a Judgment is obtained in Singapore against any person... in respect of liability required to be insured by the Compulsory Insurance Legislation the Insurer Concerned [Respondent] will satisfy the Original Judgment Creditor if and to the extent that the Judgment has not been satisfied by the Judgment Debtor within twenty-eight days from the date upon which the person in whose favor it was given is entitl