The Trade Unions Act mandates that employers must follow statutory procedures for challenging union registrations, and alternative remedies should be exhausted before resorting to judicial review.

[1] In this appeal, the two questions posed to this court are:

(i) "Whether s 71A of Trade Unions Act 1959 (Act 262) applies to the employer?"; and

(ii) "Whether the existence of a statutory appeal procedure/alternative remedy is a bar to judicial review or declaratory reliefs?".

[2] The facts as elucidated before the court of Appeal are as follows. The Penang Turf Club (the appellant as the plaintiff), through one of its public officers initiated action in the High court over the registration of the 2nd respondent under s 12(1) of the Trade Unions Act 1959 (Act 262) as a trade union of workmen by the 1st respondent. The 1st respondent is the Director General of Trade Unions ("the DGTU") whilst the 2nd respondent is the Penang Turf Club Race Day Worker's Union ("the workers union"). The 2nd respondent was registered under s 12(1) of the Act 262. The appellant refused to give recognition to the 2nd respondent as a trade union because it was of the view that the 2nd respondent represented casual workers who in law could not form a trade union.

[3] This appeal pertains to statutory interpretation as well as an exercise of discretion whereby the High court judge has dismissed a claim on the basis of a preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the 1st respondent that the appellant was wrong in commencing this suit without first exhausting the remedy available under s 71A of Act 262. The decision of the High court has been affirmed by the court of Appeal.

[4] The appellant in the High court has sought a declaration that the registration of the 2nd defendant (the 2nd respondent) by the 1st defendant (1st respondent) on 22 November 1994 pursuant to s 12(1) of the Act is null and void and a consequential order that the certificate of registration issued by the 1st respondent be revoked and cancelled.

[5] We are reminded here not to dwell on the merits of the claim of the appellant in the suit before the High court since the questions before us rest on the preliminary objection.

[6] In so far as the first question is posed before us we are concerned with the issue of the applicability of s 71A. The first question is predicated on the premise that Act 262 has no relevance whatsoever to an employer. It is asserted that the process of registration does not involve an employer since there is no requirement of law that an employer is to be consulted or informed of the intended formation of a trade union that is likely to represent his employees. It is further contended that the employer is only brought into the picture when the newly registered trade union serves a claim for recognition pursuant to s 9(2) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 (Act 177).

[7] It is noted that while Acts 177 and 262 are separate legislation the ensuing question is whether on the issue of a trade union, the employer is totally unconnected when on the facts of this appeal a dispute has arisen on account of the refusal of recognition. Learned counsel for the appellant has urged upon us that the appellant does not fall within the scope of s 71A which refers to the availability of an appellate process. This entails an appraisal of various provisions of the relevant legislation. Reference is first made to Act 262 the specific provisions of which are:

Trade Unions Act 1959

Interpretation

2. (1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires or it is otherwise expressly provided:

"employer" means any person or body of persons, whether corporate or unincorporate, who employs a workman, and includes the Government and any statutory authority;

"trade dispute" means any dispute betwe