The legal principle asserts that a disciplinary inquiry beyond statutory time limits is unlawful and supports the right to seek declaratory relief despite available statutory remedies.

Azimah Omar JCA:

A. Background Facts

[1] The Appeal before us concerns the Appellant-Plaintiff's Originating Summons for an injunction and declaratory reliefs to restrain the Respondents (particularly the 3rd Respondent) from proceeding with a further disciplinary inquiry primarily in reliance of ss 103B(1) and 99(3A) of the Legal Profession Act 1976 (" LPA ").

[2] The Appellant contended that the 3rd Respondent was at least four (4) years and one (1) month out of time (since the appointment of the 3rd Respondent by the 2nd Respondent in 2016) to commence a further inquiry into a complaint lodged against the Appellant.

[3] Nonetheless, during the Appeal Hearing before us on 29 March 2023, the Appellant-Plaintiff only proceeded to seek the Declaratory Reliefs sought vide the Originating Summons. Thus, we are minded to address and deliberate upon the present Appeal only to the extent of the propriety of the Declarations applied for, and not the injunctive relief previously applied for to restrain the adjudicative functions of the 3rd Respondent.

[4] We are also minded to note that the present Appeal does not at all deal with the actual merits of the alleged misconduct complained against the Appellant. Instead, the present Appeal only revolves around the Appellant's procedural objection against the 3rd Respondent's inquiry which the Appellant contended to have been made out of time in contravention of ss 103B(1) and 99(3A) of the LPA . Thus, we are also minded to not delve into the substantive merits of the complaint and limit our Appellate intervention to the scope of the curial or procedural law involved in the Appellant's objections. In any case, it is apt for us to briefly lay down the background facts which led to the Appellant's objections under its Originating Summons.

[5] Tania Scivetti ("the Plaintiff / Appellant") is an advocate and solicitor of the High Court of Malaya and the sole proprietor of the firm, Messrs Scivetti & Associates. The Plaintiff is also a member of the Bar Council ("the 1st Defendant / 1st Respondent").

[6] As mentioned in the above paragraph, the 1st Respondent is the Bar Council. The 1st Respondent is the Bar Council of Malaysia established under s 47 of the LPA for the primary purpose of managing the affairs of the Malaysian Bar and performance of the functions of the Malaysian Bar under the .

[7] The 2nd Respondent is the Disciplinary Board ("2nd Respondent / DB") established under s 93 of the LPA to exercise the functions of the Bar Council for the purposes of disciplinary proceedings primarily under Part VII of the .

[8] The 3rd Respondent is the Disciplinary Committee ("3rd Respondent / DC") which from time to time will be appointed by the 2nd Respondent under s 103A of the LPA in circumstances where the DB deems that a DC is necessary to be appointed to further inquire into a complaint lodged against a solicitor.

[9] Succinctly, a complaint was lodged against the Appellant alleging that the firm had wrongfully instructed the firm's legal clerk (not a registered solicitor with the Bar Council), one Muhammad Akbar Abdul Gafoor ("En Akbar") to represent its client, one Azman Bahari ("the client"), in a Hearing on 4 November 2014 under Dangerous Drugs (Special Preventive Measures) Act 1985 at the Pusat Pemulihan Akhlak Batu Gajah, Perak ("the impugned Hearing").

[10] The Appellant however, contended that En Akbar was in attendance with another two solicitors from the firm (Syazwani Mohd Zawawi and Nor Rabiatul Bahari) only in the capacity to assist these two solicitors who were actually instructed to represent the client and take conduct of the proceedings during the i