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2016 MarsdenLR 1311

HIGH COURT MALAYA MELAKA
TAN SHERRY – Appellant
Versus
SOO SHENG FATT – Respondent
[Divorce Petition No: 33NCVC-130-09-2015]



Welfare of the child is the paramount consideration in custody decisions, supporting joint custody where cooperation between parents is feasible.

Headnote:The court addressed the determination of custody in light of the welfare of the child as prescribed by statutory provisions, emphasizing the preference for joint custody over sole custody based on the parents' ability to cooperate. The court found no merit in the petitioner's request for sole custody, advocating for a joint custodial order due to evident cooperative capability between parents. The court ultimately ordered joint custody to ensure the active involvement of both parents in significant decisions regarding the child's upbringing and education. Orders accordingly.

Table of Content
1. single issue remaining—joint vs. sole custody. (Para 1 , 2 , 3)
2. primary focus on child's welfare in custody orders. (Para 4 , 5 , 10)
3. judicial support for joint custody encourages parental involvement. (Para 6 , 7 , 12 , 13)
4. historical basis for custody principles well-established. (Para 8 , 9 , 15 , 16)
5. court emphasizes active parental involvement in custody. (Para 14)
6. petitioner's claims lack evidence; joint custody preferred. (Para 17 , 18 , 19)

[1] The parties had, following court annexed mediation, resolved all issues arising from this Petition except for one, that is, the issue of sole or joint custody of the only child of the marriage Glynnis Soo Wen Xin (f).

[2] The respondent/husband had agreed that the child be under the care and control of the petitioner/wife and had further agreed that the child be brought to live with the petitioner in Singapore, where the petitioner works, and for the child to be enrolled in a school in Singapore. The parties had also agreed that the respondent shall have reasonable access to the child and shall have visitation rights to visit the child at the petitioner's parent's home in Kluang, Johor, on the third weekend of every month.

[3] The petitioner was insistent on getting sole legal custody of the child, which the respondent was not agreeable to. The respondent wanted to retain his rights to have a say in the child's education and future, and thus wanted to have joint legal custody, whilst allowing the petitioner to have care and control of the child.

[4] Trial proceeded to determine this single issue. Both the petitioner and the respondent gave evidence. Having considered the facts and the law, I ordered that though the parties had agreed that the petitioner shall have care and control of the child, both the petitioner and respondent shall have joint legal custody of the child. My reasons for that decision are as follows.

[5] The expression 'custody' does not mean an indivisible whole, it is divisible into constituent elements which could enable the court to give 'care and control' of a child to one parent and to give access and the remaining constituent element of custody to the other or jointly to both. In Helen Ho Quee Neo v. Lim Pui Heng , , the Singapore court of Appeal held that:

"A line of English authorities from as far back as 1886 has established that split orders can be made so as to give custody to one parent and care and control to the other. Where the parents are unimpeachable in respect of their characters, conduct and capacity to cooperate in caring for the welfare of the child, even orders for joint custody can be made - see J v. C [1970] AC 668 and Jussa v. Jussa [1972] 2 All ER 600. It should also be noted that ss 3 and 5 of our Guardianship of Infants Act (Cap 22) follow the lines of corresponding provisions in the United Kingdom - see Re W (JC) [1963] 3 All ER 459 and Re F [1969] 2 All ER 766 which throw further light on the making of split orders after a consideration of such provisions.

Re W (JC), supra makes it clear that it has become common practice in England to make split orders.

Lord Denning LJ in Wakeham v. Wakeham [1954] 1 All ER 434 approved of such orders as being realistic."

[6] Such a split order of custody was recognised by the Malaysian court of Appeal in Chan Beng Tiow v. Kok Mei Mooi , .

[7] The law is that, where the custody of the child is concerned, the first and paramount consideration is the welfare of the child. This long established legal principle is also statutorily embodied in s 88 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 ("LRA"). And in making a custody order the court is empowered by s 89 of the LRA to impose such conditions as the court may think fit and proper, which would include matters relating to the upbringing and education of the child.

[8] Raja Azlan Shah FJ (as His Highness then was) expressed this principle very clearly in Teh Eng Kim v. Yew Peng Siong , , where His Lordship said:

"As t

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