2015 MarsdenLR 810
COURT OF APPEAL PUTRAJAYA
DILBAR NAZAROVA – Appellant
Versus
PP & ANOTHER APPEALS – Respondent
[Criminal Appeal No: B-05-285-02/2013 (UZB) & B-05-286-02/2013 (UZB) And B-05-287-02/2013 (UZB)]
Knowledge of concealed drugs can be inferred from circumstantial evidence and the presumption of possession based on statutory provisions.
Headnote:The appellants were charged under section 39B(1)(a) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 for trafficking methamphetamine. The Trial Judge established a prima facie case after evaluating evidence proving the drugs were concealed for trafficking. The appellants' defense lacked credibility and was deemed a concoction, failing to create reasonable doubt. The Court affirmed the conviction and imposed death sentences as the evidence exceeded statutory limits triggering section 37(da).
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| 1. defense failed to challenge prosecution effectively against drugs trafficking charges. (Para 58) |
[46] The crux of the appellants' defence were grounded upon the issue of knowledge of the drugs in the trolley bags because the said bags were given to them by one Shohruh. The appellants' defence was said to be consistent with their cautioned statements, exhs D54, D55 and D56 which were given at the earliest available opportunity on 8 September 2010, that is, one day after their arrest. It is undeniable that the trial judge had failed to consider the contents of exhs D54, D55 and D56 in her written grounds of judgment. However, in exercising our appellate jurisdiction, we may in law rehear the case. We are empowered and also duty bound to carry out an examination exercise of exhs D54, D55 and D56. In the recent case of PP v. Azilah bin Hadri & Anor, [2015] 1 MLJ 617, on the respondent's complaint that the trial judge in a murder case had failed to consider the ingredient of common intention in His Lordship's grounds of judgment, the Federal Court had this to say:
"An appeal is a continuation of proceedings by way of rehearing and an Appeal Court may subject the evidence to a critical re-examination (Ahmad Najib bin Aris v. PP, [2009] 2 MLJ 613, Mohamad bin Deraman; [2011] 3 MLJ 289; [2011]3 CLJ 601."
[47] Now let us make a critical examination and evaluation of the material parts pertaining to Shohruh and the three bags in the cautioned statements, exhs D54, D55 and D56.
(a) In exh D54, the 2nd appellant said he went to Tashkent Airport together with the 3rd appellant. On the way, they stopped at a certain house. He went to buy cigarette. When he came back, he noticed a man. The man was a stranger to him. The man asked him to follow to the airport. At Tashkent Airport, on the instructions of the man, the 2nd appellant removed his clothings from a plastic bag and put them into a bag given by the said man.
(b) In exh D55, the 1st appellant said she went to Tashkent Airport together with the 3rd appellant. At the airport, Shohruh came. That was the first time she saw him. Shohruh instructed her, the 2nd, and 3rd appellant to put their clothings in the bags given by him (ie Shohruh).
(c) In exh D56, the 3rd appellant said that on the way to Tashkent Airport, she met Shohruh. Shohruh told her that the 2nd appellant would come along. The 3rd appellant and Shohruh stopped at a certain house where Shohruh took out three bags. Shohruh asked them to transfer their personal belongings into the new bags. The 3rd appellant examined the bag which was empty. When they arrived at Tashkent Airport, the 3rd appellant examined in her bag. They were traveling to Malaysia by Uzbekistan Airways.
[48] It would appear that the so-called Shohruh was only known to the 3rd appellant. The 3rd appellant was on the way to Tashkent Airport when she stopped and met Shohruh at a certain house. Shohruh took out three bags and the appellants were given one bag each. The evidence of the 3rd appellant had contradicted the evidence of the 1st appellant. According to the 1st appellant, she met Shohruh for the first time at Tashkent Airport. At the said airport, she was given a bag. The bag was not given to her at the house on the way to the airport. Whilst the 2nd appellant said that he went to the Tashkent Airport together with the 3rd appellant. On the way, they stopped at a certain house. He went to buy cigarette. On his return, the 2nd appellant noticed a man. That was the first time the 2nd appellant saw the man. The 2nd appellant did not say he received any bag at the said house. According to the 2nd appellant, he was only given the bag by the man at the Tashkent Airport. The 2nd appellant put his clothings in the bag on the instruction of the said man. Who was the said man? Was he Shohruh?
[49] Unlike the 3rd appellant, the 1st and 2nd appellant did not know Shohruh personally. Neither had they seen him before their meeting at Tashkent Airport. The ev