2016 MarsdenLR 2133
COURT OF APPEAL PUTRAJAYA
MALAYAN BANKING BERHAD – Appellant
Versus
SAUJANA PESONA SDN BHD & ORS – Respondent
[Civil Appeal No: Q-02-2453-10-2012]
The limitation period under the Sarawak Limitation Ordinance can be reset by explicit admissions of debt; however, undeniable lapses trigger a time-bar on claims.
Headnote:This judgment analyzes the application of O 14A of the Rules of the High Court 1980 regarding the dismissal of the appellant's suit as time-barred under the Sarawak Limitation Ordinance (Cap 49). The appellant claimed RM621,122.81 by arguing that the limitation period was reset by subsequent acknowledgments of debts, yet the court confirmed the initial notice dated 27 February 2002 as definitive in marking the start of the limitation period. The primary issue evaluated was whether the appellant's suit was time-barred due to the expiration of the six-year limitation period following the first demand. The court concluded that the suit against the main respondent was indeed time-barred, whereas the proceedings against the guarantors were within the limitation period as demand notices were sent within the stipulated time frame. The appeal was partly allowed, with cost implications for both parties.
| Table of Content |
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| 1. appellant's claim is assessed for timeliness with reference to limitation periods. (Para 1 , 2 , 3) |
| 2. background of the appellant's banking facility and subsequent legal actions. (Para 4 , 5 , 6) |
| 3. defendant's counterclaims regarding time-bar on the loan recovery are noted. (Para 10 , 11) |
| 4. determination of acknowledgment and demand relevance in limitation context. (Para 19 , 20 , 21) |
| 5. final ruling clarifying court's decision on time-bar issues concerning guarantors. (Para 28) |
[1] This is the appellant's (plaintiff in the High Court) appeal against the decision of the learned judge in chambers allowing the respondents' application under O 14A of Rules of the High 1980 ('RHC 1980') and dismissing the appellant's suit. The only issue in this appeal is whether the appellant's claim against the respondents is time-barred.
[2] The learned judge held that the appellant's suit was time-barred against all the respondents. The learned judge found that the appellant's letter of demand was issued to the 1st respondent only on 27 February 2002 and deemed to have expired on 5 August 2008. The appellant's suit was filed against all the respondents on 15 October 2009.
[3] For the background to this appeal, we reproduce the relevant passages in the ruling in chambers made by the learned judge on 29 August 2012 in allowing the respondents' Summons in Chambers application dated 6 June 2012 under O 14A RHC 1980 and dismissing the appellant's writ and statement of claim with cost of RM3,000.00. The relevant passages reads:
"The plaintiff bank had offered and the 1st defendant had accepted a banking facility in the form of a revolving fixed facility for the sum of RM750,000.00 way back on the 23 November 1996. The 2nd and 3rd defendants are husband and wife respectively who set up the 1st defendant company and are guarantors to the said facility. After an initial drawdown of RM200,000.00, the plaintiff bank reduced the amount of facility to RM350,000.00 and refused to reinstate the original amount offered despite the defendant's appeal. This reduction has caused the 1st defendant's business to suffer. The defendants then took an action against the bank in Suit No: 22-11-99-II claiming damages for breach of contract. After a full trial of the action, judgment was entered against the plaintiff bank on 6 July 2009. That judgment was set aside on appeal by the Court of Appeal on 17 April 2012.
Meanwhile on 15 October 2009 the plaintiff bank filed this action, just about three months after the judgment obtained against them in the earlier suit, for the 1st defendant's failure in servicing the monthly installments for the facility. After setting off a sum of RM207,400.32 being the fixed deposit in the 1st defendant's account, the amount outstanding as at 31 July, 2009 was RM621,122.81 and that was the amount claimed by the plaintiff bank in this action together with interest and cost.
After service of the writ of summons and statement of claim, the defendants filed a conditional appearance as well as an application to strike out the plaintiff bank's claim on the ground that limitation has set in. This is because the plaintiff bank's first letter of demand was dated 22 February 2002. I heard that application and agreed that limitation has set in but the Court of Appeal reversed the said decision and ordered that the matter to go for trial. The defendants have since filed their statement of defence, again alleging that limitation has set in.
The defendants have now filed an O 14A application for a question of law to be determined, ie whether the plaintiff's claim is time-barred under the provisions of the Sarawak Limitation Ordinance (Cap 49). In their affidavit and in their counsel's written submission before me, it is stated that my earlier decision on the striking out was reversed based on the Court of Appeal decision in Tasja Sdn Bhd v. Golden Approach Sdn Bhd , which was submitted and relied on by the plaint