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2014 MarsdenLR 514
COURT OF APPEAL PUTRAJAYA
RAJAMORGAN MARIMUTHU – Appellant
Versus
PP – Respondent
[Criminal Appeal No: B-05-282-10-2011]
Circumstantial evidence must incontrovertibly point to an accused's guilt; failure to establish a clear linkage or motive results in acquittal.
Headnote:(A) Penal Code - Section 302 - Appeal against conviction and death sentence - The court considered whether the prosecution substantiated its case based solely on circumstantial evidence, noting that the absence of direct evidence implicating the appellant and presence of conflicting evidence negated the sufficiency of the prosecution's claim - The failure of the prosecution to establish a clear motive and the presence of DNA from a female individual complicated the circumstantial evidence against the appellant. (Paras 6, 22-34)
(B) Circumstantial Evidence - The court elaborated on the guiding principles of appellate intervention in cases relying on circumstantial evidence, emphasizing that such evidence must lead to a conclusion solely consistent with the accused's guilt and must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. (Paras 22-24)
(C) Last Seen Evidence - The court stated that last seen evidence, while relevant, cannot alone suffice for conviction without corroborating evidence, rejecting the prosecution's reliance on this aspect. (Paras 27-29)
Facts of the case:
The appellant, convicted of murder, challenged the legality of the conviction asserting that the prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence, failing to establish a motive, and that a significant coexisting female DNA profile pointed towards another suspect. The acts of the appellant concerning the deceased did not, on the evidence presented, lead to a definitive conclusion of guilt.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the prosecution did not prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt and the conviction was unsafe to uphold. The appeal was allowed, leading to acquittal.
Issues: The key issues included whether circumstantial evidence sufficiently implicated the appellant and whether the last seen evidence alone could substantiate a murder conviction.
Ratio Decidendi: The court concluded that without a clear chain of circumstantial evidence linking the appellant unequivocally to the crime, the conviction could not be sustained.
Result: Appeal allowed, conviction and sentence set aside, appellant acquitted and discharged.
| Table of Content |
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| 1. appeal against conviction and sentence (Para 1 , 2 , 3) |
| 2. guidelines for appellate interference (Para 4 , 5 , 6 , 7) |
[1] This is an appeal against the judgment dated 29 September 2011 passed by the High Court at Shah Alam, Selangor, by which the Court convicted the appellant under s 302 of the Penal Code ("the Code") and sentenced him to death.
[2] The appellant was charged as follows:
"Bahawa kamu, pada 3 Mac 2010 di antara jam 9.40 malam hingga 10.10 malam di Taman Permainan Kanak-kanak Pangsapuri Vista Damansara, Jalan Kenangan, Kampung Sungai Ayu Ara, 47400 Petaling Jaya, di dalam Daerah Petaling, di dalam Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan, telah melakukan pembunuhan dengan niat menyebabkan kematian kepada Xxxxxxxxxx A/L Xxxxxxxxx No KP: XXXXXX-XX-XXXX. Oleh yang demikian, kamu telah melakukan satu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah s 302 Kanun Keseksaan."
[3] Aggrieved, the appellant lodged this appeal to challenge the legality and correctness of the conviction and sentence.
[4] We have heard Mr Murali Achan and Mr Kulasekar, learned counsel appearing for the appellant and Mr Andi Razalijaya A Dadi, learned Deputy Public Prosecutor ("DPP") appearing for the public prosecutor. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the arguments advanced by them. We have also perused the Appeal Records of this case and closely scrutinised the evidence led by both the parties.
[5] We are mindful that this is a factually based appeal. In the course of the submission before us, the DPP had reminded us the danger of interfering with the finding of facts of the trial judge, who had seen and heard the witnesses.
[6] The basic principle which guides our courts in appeals against findings of fact is trite. An appellate Court will not impeach the finding of facts by a first instance or trial Court that saw and heard witnesses give evidence, except in certain very limited circumstances. An appellate Court may, however, interfere in a case in which the reasons given by a trial judge are not satisfactory, or where it is clear from the evidence that the trial judge misdirected himself. Where a trial judge misdirects himself or herself and draws erroneous inferences from the facts, an appellate Court is in as good a position as the trial judge to evaluate the evidence and determine what inference should be drawn from the proved facts. Where therefore there is an appeal against the finding of facts, the burden upon the appellant is a very heavy one. An appellate Court will only interfere if it finds that the Court of first instance was clearly and blatantly wrong, or, as it is sometimes more elegantly stated, exceeded the generous ambit within which reasonable disagreement is possible. (See Sivalingam Periasamy v. Periasamy & Anor, , Multar Masngud v. Lim Kim Chet & Anor; [1982] 1 MLJ 184; [1982] CLJ Rep 237 and Choo Kok Beng v. Choo Kok Hoe and Ors; [1984] 2 MLJ 165b).
[7] Having scrutinised the entire evidence adduced before the Court, we are of the considered opinion that this is a case in which appellate intervention is warranted. On the facts of the present case it would be unsafe to allow the conviction of the appellant to stand. We are not satisfied that the prosecution had proved its case to the required standard. For that reason we unanimously allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction and sentence passed by the High Court. The appellant was acquitted and discharged. We now give our reasons for so deciding.
