JUDGMENTBY: CHAN J

A slander is actionable per se if it contains an allegation or imputation of a crime which can be punished corporally: Webb v Beavan (1883) 11 QBD 609 Pollock B. said at p. 610:

"... I think the passages in Comyns Digest are conclusive to shew that

words which impute any criminal offence are actionable per se. The

distinction seems a natural one, that words imputing that the plaintiff

has rendered himself liable to the mere infliction of a fine are not

slanderous, but that it is slanderous to say that he has done something

for which he can be made to suffer corporally."

In Hellwig v Mitchell [1910] 1 KB 609, 612 Bray J. put it thus:

"In the absence of special damage slander is only actionable in certain

cases, one of which is where the words impute the commission of a

criminal offence punishable by imprisonment".

The judge went on to say at pp. 613 -- 614:

"It was contended, however, that the rule does not require that the

criminal offence should be one punishable by imprisonment, and that it

is sufficient if the offence be one which renders the offender liable

to summary arrest and detention. This is not a question of principle,

but of judge-made law, and therefore I must look at the authorities to

see how far they support this contention. The first case to which I

will refer is Webb v Beavan 11 QBD 609, in which the court had to

consider the question whether it is necessary to allege that the words

impute an indictable offence, and it was held that it was not

necessary. Pollock B. in giving judgment said: The expression

indictable offence seems to have crept into the text-books, but I

think the passages in Comyns Digest are conclusive to shew that

words which impute any criminal offence are actionable per se. The

distinction seems a natural one, that words imputing that the plaintiff

has rendered himself liable to the mere infliction of a fine are not

slanderous, but that it is slanderous to say that he has done something

for which he can be made to suffer corporally. Those last words are,

undoubtedly, somewhat ambiguous and may be wide enough to include an

offence which, though not punishable by imprisonment, renders the

offender liable to arrest. The judgment of Lopez J. in Webb v.

Beavan does not carry the matter any further. The next case is

Michael v Spiers & Pond, Ld 25 TLR 740, where it was contended by

counsel for the plaintiff that the joint effect of section 12 of the

Licensing Act, 1872, and section 5 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act,

1879, was to make drunkenness on licensed premises an offence which

exposed the person committing it to punishment corporally. The

plaintiff under section 1 of the Licensing Act, 1902, was liable to be

dealt with corporally on the spot, and therefore this was a slander

which was actionable per se. It appears, therefore, that the argument

which has been raised here was also raised in Michael v. Spiers &

Pond, Ld., but A.T. Lawrence J. apparently did not find it necessary

to decide the point, for he held that there was no imputation of an

offence within section 1 of the Licensing Act, 1902, but he used these

words: As, therefore, there is no imputation of an indictable offence

or of an offence for which a person can be made to suffer corporally by

way of punishment, I think special damage is necessary. That is a

dictum that the corporal suffering must be by way of punishment. I

cannot find in the books a trace of authority for saying that words

imputing that the plaintiff has done an act for which he may be

arrested, but which is only punishable by a fine, are actionable

without proof of special damage, or that a mere liability to arrest is

sufficient to make the cri

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