COURT OF APPEAL PUTRAJAYA
KETUA PENGARAH HASIL DALAM NEGERI – Appellant
Versus
YAYASAN BUAH PINGGANG KEBANGSAAN MALAYSIA – Respondent
Ground 1: Error in Identifying the Impugned Decision
The Court of Appeal erred in law by holding that the impugned decision for judicial review purposes was the letter dated 17 June 2020, rather than the original revocation letter dated 29 August 2019. The initial revocation was a complete, operative and final decision, clearly stating the effective revocation from Year of Assessment 2017, imposition of tax liability, and invalidity of donation receipts thereafter. Post-revocation communications, including requests for responses, meetings, and responses to appeals, did not constitute a formal reconsideration or review process that supplanted or revived the original decision. Such interactions were merely administrative courtesies or opportunities for the respondent to provide explanations, without any indication of an open reconsideration that reset the time limit under Order 53 rule 3(6) of the Rules of Court 2012. (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!)
Ground 2: No Evidence of Reconsideration by Conduct
The Court of Appeal misdirected itself by inferring a reconsideration from the appellant's conduct, where no express or implied review process was undertaken. The appellant's letters consistently maintained the revocation (e.g., 25 November 2019 and 17 June 2020), merely offering new application options without altering or suspending the original decision. Routine handling of appeals to the Minister of Finance or further audits does not equate to reconsideration; it reflects standard procedural fairness, not a substantive re-evaluation that restarts the three-month limitation period. (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!)
Ground 3: Strict Application of Time Limit Essential to Jurisdiction
The Court of Appeal failed to apply the mandatory and strict three-month time limit under Order 53 rule 3(6), which goes to jurisdiction and admits no discretion or extension absent a formal application. Even if the 17 June 2020 letter were considered, the respondent's filing on 17 September 2020 was out of time when properly computed, depriving the High Court of jurisdiction ab initio. The respondent's knowledge of the revocation from 29 August 2019 (acknowledged 3 September 2019) triggered the limitation period at the latest. (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!)
Ground 4: Incorrect Computation of Time from 17 June 2020 Letter
The Court of Appeal erred in computing the three-month period from the 17 June 2020 letter:
(a) Service was not strictly under section 145 of the Income Tax Act 1967, as the letter was not a "notice of assessment" but a reaffirmation; actual receipt or earlier knowledge applies.
(b) Even deeming service on 18 June 2020, the period under Order 3 rule 2(2) Rules of Court 2012 commences the day after (19 June 2020), but "three months" expires on 17 September 2020 at latest—filing on that date is borderline and should exclude non-court days or be deemed late without proof of exact lodgment time.
(c) Gregorian calendar computation to 18 September 2020 was wrongly applied, ignoring precise rules for limitation periods. (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!)
Ground 5: Public Policy and Good Administration Undermined
The Court of Appeal's approach encourages delay in judicial review applications by treating routine post-decision dialogues as reconsideration, undermining certainty in tax administration and the finality of public authority decisions. This contravenes the purpose of strict time limits to promote prompt challenges and efficient governance. (!) (!) (!) (!) (!)
Allow the appeal, set aside the Court of Appeal's decision dated 1 April 2024, discharge the High Court's leave for judicial review granted on 26 August 2022, and declare the respondent's judicial review application time-barred with costs throughout. (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!)
JUDGMENT
Introduction
[1] The appellant is the Lembaga Hasil Dalam Negeri ("LHDN"). The respondent is the Yayasan Buah Pinggang Kebangsaan Malaysia or the National Kidney Foundation of Malaysia ("NKF"). At all material times, NKF enjoyed "tax-exempt" status pursuant to s 44(6) of the Income Tax Act 1967 ("the Act"). LHDN conducted a tax audit on NKF and then by letters dated 29 August 2019, they informed NKF of the violation of the conditions attached to the tax-exempt status and decided to revoke NKF's tax-exempt status. For convenience, we shall refer the LHDN's letters dated 29 August 2019 in the singular as letter dated 29 August 2019. NKF promptly made representations to LHDN and also to the Minister of Finance ("MOF") for a reconsideration and for the tax-exempt status to be maintained. NKF was then invited to give its input and was also asked to attend a meeting with LHDN to discuss the matter.
[2] Based on the events and the exchange of correspondence, it is fair to say that LHDN did review or reconsider the matter. We think that it is necessary and imperative that we should mention here that the conduct or stance of LHDN (as the tax authority) in enterta
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