The order for damages reassessment is appealable as it does not fall under the non-appealable 'ruling' as defined by the CJA.

[14] Before the court of Appeal, counsel for Kempadang raised only one issue to oppose the appeal ie that the learned JC's order was not a final decision as defined by s 3 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (the CJA) and was therefore not appealable. Kempadang said that the learned JC's order was a ruling and that a ruling is not a court decision since it does not finally dispose the rights of parties and thus it is non-appealable. However, the court of Appeal disagreed with Kempadang's argument and held that the appeal was competent, ie the learned JC's order was appealable.

[15] On the merits of the appeal, the court of Appeal allowed Perkayuan's appeal, set aside the learned JC's order and awarded nominal damages of RM10,000.00 to Kempadang. It also held that Kempadang had been given the opportunity to produce its evidence at the hearing of the assessment of damages yet it failed to prove the amount of damages claimed. Therefore, the learned JC had no basis in making an order for reassessment of damages. In the circumstance, the learned JC ought to have granted Kempadang nominal damages.

The Appeal Before The Federal court

[16] Referring to the question of law posed before this court, the issue in the appeal lies in the construction to be given to subsection 67(1) of the CJA. The said provision confers on the court of Appeal jurisdiction to hear and determine civil appeals from any judgment or order of the High court made in the exercise of its original or of its appellate jurisdiction.

[17]Subsection 67(1) of the CJA reads:

"67. Jurisdiction to hear and determine civil appeals

(1) The court of Appeal shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine appeals from any judgment or order of any High court in any civil cause or matter, whether made in the exercise of its original or of its appellate jurisdiction, subject nevertheless to this or any other written law regulating the terms and conditions upon which such appeals shall be brought."

The Appellant's Submission

[18] The thrust of Kempadang's argument is that the words "judgment" and "order" in s 67 of the CJA are to be read in the light of s 3 of the CJA.

[19] The relevant provision of s 3 reads:

""decision"

means judgment, sentence or order, but does not include any ruling made in the course of a trial or hearing of any cause or matter which does not finally dispose of the rights of the parties;"

[20] Applying s 3 of the CJA to the issue at hand, counsel for Kempadang contended that the decision of the learned JC ordering damages to be reassessed before a different Deputy Registrar is not one which finally disposes of the rights of the parties. This renders the decision non-appealable. The following authorities were cited in support: Datuk Seri Tiong King Sing v. Datuk Seri Ong Tee Keat & Anor, 2014 MarsdenLR 2625 ; Christopher Eandi v. Tumbung Nakis & Anor; Jamil Sindi (Third Party); [2016] 4 MLJ 100; [2016] 4 CLJ 831.

The Respondent's Submission

[21] However, counsel for Perkayuan took the position that the absence of the word "decision" in subsection 67(1) of the CJA renders s 3 inapplicable; that the words "judgment" and "order" in s 67 of the CJA are specific words and ought not be read within the context of "decision" in s 3 of the CJA.

[22] It was further submitted that the meaning of the word "decision" in s 3 of the CJA only applies to criminal appeals. Unlike subsection 67(1), s 50 of the CJA specifically states that "in respect of criminal appeals, the court of Appeal shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine any appeal against any decision made by the High court ..." [Emphasis Added]

[23] Perkayuan cited the decision of the court of Appeal in T