SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Article Pause Article
judgment-img

2025 MarsdenLR 6017

COURT OF APPEAL PUTRAJAYA
CHAMPION SCORE SDN BHD – Appellant
Versus
MOHD SOBRI CHEW ABDULLAH – Respondent
[Civil Appeal No: P-02(NCvC)(W)-2249-12/2022]



Petitioner Advocates:Ooi Zie Yiong; ,Respondent Advocate: Neoh Hor Kee,Goo Chun Kit,Dylan Navarednam

The court ruled that a developer acting as a bare trustee cannot create a valid charge over property sold to a purchaser, thus protecting the purchaser's rights under the Housing Development Act.

Headnote:(A) Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Act 1966 - Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Regulations 1989 - Section 340 of the National Land Code - Charge created by developer over property sold to purchaser - Developer acted as bare trustee and could not validly create charge - Charge declared null and void - Court emphasized the statutory obligation to deliver unencumbered title to purchaser. (Paras 2, 9, 10, 18, 40, 100)

(B) Indefeasibility of title - Charge created under insufficient instrument is not indefeasible - Protection of weaker party in housing transactions is paramount - Legislative intent to prevent encumbrance of property post-sale is clear. (Paras 18, 40, 96)

(C) Public policy - Court invoked public policy to protect rights of first purchaser against developer's improper actions - Balance of equities favors the innocent purchaser against the lender. (Paras 96, 100)

Facts of the case:
The plaintiff, having fully paid for a house, discovered that a charge had been created over the property by the developer, who had acted as a bare trustee, resulting in a legal dispute regarding the validity of the charge.

Findings of Court:
The charge was declared null and void as it was created without the purchaser's consent and in breach of statutory obligations by the developer.

Issues: The main issues included whether the developer could validly create a charge over property sold to the purchaser and the implications of the statutory obligations under the Housing Development Act.

Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the developer, as a bare trustee, lacked the authority to create a charge, thus rendering it void. The court emphasized the importance of protecting the rights of homebuyers as a matter of public policy.

Result: Appeal dismissed and costs awarded to the respondent.

Table of Content
1. background of the case and parties involved (Para 1 , 3 , 4)
JUDGMENT Lee Swee Seng JCA:

[1] No one and certainly not the plaintiff in the High Court below, would have thought that after paying the full purchase price for a house in a development undertaken by Syarikat Perumahan Negara Bhd ("SPNB"), he would be shockingly awakened to the reality that the title to his house for which he had taken possession, is now the subject of a charge created over the property in favour of a moneylender by the developer.

[2] After all one would expect a developer who had entered into a joint-venture with SPNB to develop the master titles into a housing estate to have the decency to abide by its contractual obligation under the statutorily prescribed Sale and Purchase Agreement ("SPA") in the form of Schedule G of the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Regulations 1989 ("the Housing Regulations") . That obligation included not to encumber the property upon an SPA being signed with the purchaser, and more importantly to undertake as required under the statutory contract, to deliver an unencumbered title to the house after completion and the payment of the full purchase price.

[3] Upon discovery of this horror, the house buyer sued SPNB as the 1st defendant ("D1"), UDI Property Sdn Bhd, the developer as the 2nd defendant ("D2") and the moneylender Champion Score Sdn Bhd, as the 3rd defendant ("D3") in the High Court below. The plaintiff essentially prayed for the relief that the charge be cancelled and the title be transferred back to him as the rightful beneficial owner and further that D1 and D2 are to effect the said transfer failing which the registrar of the Court shall execute the necessary Transfer instrument.

[4] The SPA entered into with the plaintiff as purchaser is a tri-partite SPA as prescribed under Schedule G of the Regulation with SPNB being named as proprietor of the land and the developer being a party to the SPA as well, being the vendor. It transpired that SPNB had given an irrevocable Power of Attorney ("PA") to the developer for the purpose of the joint-venture to sign the relevant documents and statutory forms to ensure that the houses sold and paid by the purchasers are duly registered in the purchasers' name.

At the High Court [5] The plaintiff submitted that the developer, having received the full purchase price, stood in the position of a bare trustee and so could not create a valid charge in favour of the moneylender. The charge instrument under the National Land Code (" NLC ") was a void instrument and the charge created was null and void and so ought to be set aside.

[6] Moreover, the charge could not have been validly created without the consent of the plaintiff as purchaser and the plaintiff had not consented to the charge being created. No purchaser would anyway, unless it is for a loan taken by the purchaser and the charge created as a security for the loan taken.

[7] The moneylender argued that under the Torrens system of land registration, it had made a search on the subdivided titles provided as security for the loan granted to the developer and the subdivided titles showed that they were all free from encumbrances. There was no need to inquire further as in "going behind the title" as under the mirror principle in the Torrens system of land registration, the title is everything and what is not reflected in the title by way of registration or endorsement cannot bind a prospective transferee who is not a party to the fraud.

[8] The charge created in favour of the moneylender was thus argued to be indefeasible, the other common exceptions of forgery and insufficient or void instrument being not applicable.

[9] The High Court agreed with the plaintiff and based on the authorities of the Federal Court in Samuel Naik Siang Ting v. Public Bank Berhad [2015] 5 MLRA 665 ; [2015] 6 MLJ 1; [2015] 8 CLJ 944; [2018] 3 AMR 259 ("Samuel Naik") and He-Con Sdn Bhd v. Bulyah bt Ishak & Anor (as admi

Click Here to Read the rest of this document
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
whatsapp-icon Back to top