An application for disclosure of evidence in a trial constitutes an interlocutory ruling and is not appealable under the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 as it does not resolve the rights of the parties.

Introduction

[1] This appeal relates to the ruling made by the trial Judge in the ongoing criminal trial in the High Court at Kuala Lumpur, bearing No 45 September 2009, where the appellant is facing a charge under s 377B of the Penal Code . The ruling arose from the application by the learned counsel for the appellant for the statement of the Complainant (PW 1), recorded under s 112 of the Criminal Procedure Code (112 statement), to be produced for examination by the appellant. Learned trial judge dismissed the application and the reasons for his decision are found in his judgment dated 11 May 2010. For the reasons appearing in this judgment, we are not concerned at this stage with the issue of whether the trial judge was correct in his ruling or otherwise. The point issue in this appeal is whether the decision by the trial judge is appealable.

[2] In the Court of Appeal, the prosecution took the stand that the ruling of the trial judge under challenge does not fall within the term "decision" as defined in s 3 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (CJA) and hence was not appealable. The Court of Appeal agreed with the prosecution. The reasons for their decision are found in what is described as the "broad reasons" read out at the end of the hearing of the appeal.

[3] In his submission before us, learned counsel for the appellant firstly raised the issue of the failure of the Court of Appeal to furnish the grounds of decision until the date of this hearingeven though, according to him, the notice of appeal was filed on 28 June 2010. He submitted that without the detailed grounds of judgment, which the appellant is entitled to underr 91(1) of the Rules of the Federal 1995, the appellant is prejudiced in putting up a proper petition of appeal. In support, he cited Ankur Nath Ganguli v. Public Prosecutor , [1956] 1 MLJ 206b . On that premise, learned counsel urged this Court to direct the Court of Appeal to furnish their grounds of judgment and pending that, the appeal should stand adjourned.

[4] The learned Solicitor General II in his response submitted that the so called "broad reasons" as furnished by the Court of Appeal in this case is in fact the grounds of judgment of the Court of Appeal and the appellant can proceed with the appeal relying on the said "broad reasons". He submitted that we should look at the content and not the label assigned by the Court of Appeal. Further, since the Court of Appeal had furnished their grounds of judgment earlier, therefore, it is not open to the Court of Appeal at this juncture to furnish any further grounds. He cited a number of authorities in support of his contention. (See Lorraine Phylis Cohen & Anor v. Public Prosecutor, 1989 MarsdenLR 912 , Nathan v. PP ; 1972 MarsdenLR 247 ; [1972] 1 CLJ 99 and Ankur Nath Ganguli v. Public Prosecutor , [1956] 1 MLJ 206a).

[5] Having perused the "broad reasons", we agree with the learned Solicitor General II that the "broad reasons" as given by the Court of Appeal for all intents and purposes is their grounds of judgment in support of their decision and on that premise, it is not open to us to direct the Court of Appeal to furnish further grounds.

[6] In this connection, we wish to state that grounds or reasons for a judgment are required sothat parties, particularly the unsuccessful one, would know why the judge arrived at the decision the way he did. The rea