Mandamus cannot be issued against the wrong party and must respect statutory obligations as outlined in the relevant laws, including adherence to limitation periods for judicial review applications.

[1] There were two issues raised in this appeal which have been elaborately argued before us. The first concerns the time when the 40 days limitation set out in O 53 r 3(6) of the Rules of the High 1980 ("the RHC") begins to run in the present case. The second is whether the order of mandamus would lie against the appellant to enforce the payment of the judgment sum against the State Government of Pahang by virtue of a certificate issued under s 33(1) ("the s 33 certificate") of the Government Proceedings Act 1956 ("the GPA"). The learned trial judge found for the respondent on both the said issues. It was held that the present application was not barred by the said 40 days limitation, and that the order of mandamus would lie against the appellant to enforce the payment of the judgment sum.

[2] We heard the appeal on 5 October 2009 and after hearing submissions of counsel for both parties, we unanimously allowed the appeal with costs. I have had the advantage of reading in draft the judgment of my learned friend Jeffrey Tan JCA. I generally agree with his reasons and conclusion and wish to add some observations with regard to second issue.

[3] From the grounds of judgment, it appears to me that the learned trial judge had allowed respondent's application herein on three main grounds. First, he held that the order of mandamus could not be issued against the State Financial Officer, being the principal officer in charge of financial affairs of the State, by reason of the restriction imposed under s 44(2)(b) of the Specific Relief Act 1950 ("the SRA") . Secondly, he found that the order of mandamus could be issued against the appellant by virtue of his position as the chairman of the State Executive Council and the holder of the finance portfolio of the State. Thirdly, he also found that the respondent has the power and competence to order the payment of the judgment sum out of the Consolidated Fund of the State ("the Consolidated Fund") by virtue of art. 41(1) of the Laws of the Constitution of Pahang ("the State Constitution").

[4] Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the order of mandamus should not be issued against the appellant to comply with the s 33 certificate in respect of the judgment sum payable by the State Government to the respondent. It was contended that the appellant was not the proper party to be issued with such an order as he was not the person responsible for the financial affairs of the State. He pointed out it is expressly provided under the State Constitution that the State Financial Officer is the principal officer in charge of financial affairs of the State. Further, learned counsel submitted that s 44(2)(b) of the SRA does not expressly prohibit the making of an order against a Government servant to enforce the satisfaction of a claim upon the Government, and that the Court is still empowered to make such an order by virtue of the additional power conferred by para 1 of the Schedule to the of Judicature Act 1964. In support of this proposition, learned counsel relied on the decision of the Federal Court in Minister of Finance, Government of Sabah v. Petrojasa Sdn Bhd , 2008 MarsdenLR 4441 , where it was held that an order of mandamus would lie against the Minister in charge of financial matters of the State of Sabah for the payment of the judgment sum under the s 33 certificate.

[5] Learned counsel for the respondent supported the decision of the learned trial judge. He submitted that the appellant is obliged to pay the state's debt by virtue of his position as the head of administration of the State who also holds the por