By ex parte Summons-in-Chambers dated May 27, 1985, the plaintiff applied for an interlocutory injunction to restrain the 1st defendant (Sabah State Assembly) from sitting until the determination of Kota Kinabalu High Court Civil Suit No. K.467 of 1985 (the 1st Suit), 2nd defendant (Speaker) from conducting, permitting or causing to be permitted or continuing a sitting or any proceedings of the 1st defendant until after the trial of the 1st Suit and 3rd defendant (Deputy Speaker) from conducting, permitting or causing to be permitted or continuing a sitting or any proceedings of the 1st defendant or carrying out the duties or performing the functions of the 2nd defendant similarly until after the trial of the said 1st Suit. I dismissed the plaintiff's application against the defendants and I now give my reasons.

In support of the plaintiff's application for the interlocutory injunction the plaintiff swore an affidavit stating that apart from this Civil Suit No. K482 of 1985 (the 2nd Suit) filed on the May 27, 1985 under which this present injunction was being applied for the plaintiff had also filed in Kota Kinabalu High Court on May 22, 1985 the 1st Suit naming the Yang di-Pertua Negeri of Sabah, 1st defendant, and Datuk Joseph Pairin Kitingan, 2nd defendant, praying for declarations the gist of which is the 2nd defendant in that suit is not the lawful Chief Minister and ought not to act as such and exercise powers conferred by the Constitution. The plaintiff further stated that on May 15, 1985 the 1st defendant herein commenced its first sitting after it was summoned by the Yang di-Pertua Negeri in exercise of his powers under the Constitution the exercise of which the plaintiff alleged the Yang di-Pertua Negeri is required to act in accordance with the advice of a lawfully appointed Cabinet or a member thereof. The plaintiff also further alleged that if he is successful in the 1st Suit and relief is granted therein this will render, so the plaintiff alleges, the summoning of the 1st defendant herein as aforesaid and all subsequent adjournments nullities. The plaintiff then went on to allege that he had news of 1st defendant's next sitting would be on May 30, 1985 (the sitting) through the Radio Television Malaysia. The plaintiff urged on the Court unless the Court grants the interlocutory injunction sought in this Summons herein the defendants will carry out acts they are not legally entitled to perform or undertake.

The totality of the plaintiff's application is that he wants the Court to issue an interlocutory injunction stopping the sitting because the Yang di-Pertua Negeri has exercised his powers of summoning the sitting following the advice of a person or Cabinet which the plaintiff said had not been validly appointed and that at that sitting the plaintiff says the defendants will carry out acts they are not legally entitled to do. The plaintiff did not specify what those "acts" were.

The first thing that came to mind in considering whether I should grant an interlocutory injunction was that such injunction is a discretionary remedy and like all discretions it must be exercised on judicial principles. Next was since the total effect of granting the injunction was to restrain the Assembly from conducting its sitting, before the Court could proceed to other considerations I was of the view the crucial question that had to be answered first was whether the Court had jurisdiction to grant such injunction. The plaintiff submitted that the Court had and referred the Court to McDonald v Cain [1963] VLR 411, where the Court granted an injunction against the Ministers of the Crown and the Members of the State Executive Council of Victoria State and also against the Clerk of Parliament restraining the Clerk from transmitting the disputed Bill to the Governor for his assent before it became law and against the Ministers of the Crown to prevent them from giving the advice to the Governor that the Bill was fit for his