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FEDERAL COURT (PUTRAJAYA)
TENGKU MAIMUN TUAN MAT, CJ, ROHANA YUSUF PCA, J, NALLINI PATHMANATHAN, J, ABDUL RAHMAN SEBLI, J, HASNAH MOHAMMED HASHIM, J, MARY LIM THIAM SUAN, J, HARMINDAR SINGH DHALIWAL, FCJJ
Maria Chin Abdullah – Appellant
Versus
Ketua Pengarah Imigresen & Anor – Respondent
CIVIL APPEAL NO 01(f)-5-03 OF 2019(W)



Advocates:
Gurdial Singh Nijar (Lim Wei Jiet and Abraham Au Tian Hui with him) (Sreenevasan) for the appellant.
Shamsul Bolhassan (Liew Horng Bin with him) (Jabatan Peguam Negara) for the respondents.

Judicial review is an essential constitutional feature ensuring executive actions conform to the Federal Constitution, thereby safeguarding fundamental rights against unlawful restrictions.

Headnote:(A) Federal Constitution - Article 5(1), Article 4(1) - Immigration Act 1959/63 - The right to travel outside Malaysia is a privilege, not a fundamental liberty - Restrictions imposed by the Executive are not subject to judicial review due to an ouster clause in Section 59A - However, Article 4(1) enshrines constitutional supremacy, allowing for judicial review of laws inconsistent with the Constitution. (Paras 1, 2, 3, 4, 59A)

(B) Judicial Review - The Judiciary's role is to ensure executive actions comply with fundamental rights as embedded in the Constitution - The application of Section 59A of the Immigration Act is unconstitutional for precluding judicial review over substantive grounds. (Paras 4-5, 59, 60-62)

Facts of the case:
The appeal focuses on the legality of a travel ban placed on a citizen by the Director General of Immigration based on their criticism of the government, overriding the constitutional right to travel despite holding a valid passport. The citizen was not provided an opportunity to contest this decision.

Findings of Court:
Section 59A of the Immigration Act is void for contravening Articles 4(1) and 5(1) of the Federal Constitution.

Issues: Legality of the Director General's powers under Section 3(2) to impose travel bans, constitutional validity of Section 59A, and adherence to principles of natural justice.

Ratio Decidendi: Judicial review is constitutional under Article 4(1) and cannot be ousted by legislation; Section 59A infringes the right to judicial scrutiny and natural justice, thus is void.

Result: Appeal allowed, Section 59A is declared unconstitutional.

Nallini Pathmanathan FCJ:

JUDGMENT

Introduction

[1]For the full comprehension of the people of this nation, the net effect of the judgment of the majority of this Court is that:

a)In this day and age, namely the 21st century, the right to travel outside of Malaysia is not a fundamental liberty under art 5 of the Federal Constitution, even if you have a valid passport – it is only a privilege;

b)A person can be prohibited from travelling outside of Malaysia by the Director-General of Immigration by a law which is merely procedurally correct, without regard to its constitutional validity;

c)A decision to prohibit any person from travelling outside of Malaysia is imposed at the discretion of the Executive;

d)That decision of the Executive to prohibit or ban the citizen from travelling outside of Malaysia cannot be judicially scrutinized or reviewed by the superior Courts;

e)The law on which the decision was based is also immune from judicial scrutiny as to its constitutionality, because Parliament is entitled to legislate as it thinks fit;

f)When any person is prohibited from travelling, he cannot object or be heard on the issue of why the decision to prohibit him from travelling outside of Malaysia is wrong, or why he ought to be allowed to travel;

g)As such the superior Courts are limited in their powers of review. They may only administratively review statutes and acts or omissions of the Legislature and the Executive, but not constitutionally review the same, if Parliament deems so.

[2]That to my mind, and for the reasons articulated by the Chief Justice of Malaysia, is untenable by reason of Art 4(1) FC, which enshrines constitutional supremacy and not Parliamentary supremacy.

[3]This appeal concerns questions relating to basic fundamental liberties. I am entirely in agreement with the illuminating and comprehensive judg ment of the learned Chief Justice Tun Tengku Maimun bin ti Tuan Mat. I write this concurring judgment in support, only because I believe that a multiplicity of views on the approaches to be adopted in construing our Federal Constitution enables a better appreciation of its substance and significance.

[4]More specifically, t he appeal before us involves questions relating to the rights of a citizen to travel abroad, to freedom of expression and the right to be heard , which are fundamental liberties protected under the Federal Constitution. When such basic rights are affected by executive action , premised on statutory provisions precluding or suspending these rights , the Judiciary is constitutionally empowered , under the doctrine of the separation of powers, and more specificall y the Federal Constitution, to review the validity of such acts and provisions.

[5]However, by reason of the Legislature having enacted an ouster clause vide section 59AImmigration Act s 1959/63(‘Immigration Act s’), which seeks to prevent or preclude the Judiciary from carrying out its function and exercising its powers of review under the Federal Constitution , the more fundamental issue of the constitutionality of such an ouster clause needs study and analysis, before the questions above can even be considered by the Judiciary.

The Questions of Law in this Appeal

[6]The background facts have been set out in the learned Chief Justice’s judgment, and I shall not repeat them here.

[7]Neither will I touch on the issue raised by learned Senior Federal Counsel for the Attorney-General’s Chambers that this appeal is academic, save to state again that I concur entirely with the conclusion on that issue as adjudicated by the learned Chief Justice.

[8]I shall focus instead on the questions of law posed in this appeal:

Question 1

Whether section 3(2)Immigration Acts 1959/63empow ers the Director General with unfettered discretion to impose a travel ban? In particular, can the Director General impose a travel ban for reasons that impinge on the democratic rights of citizen s uch as criticizing the Government?

Question 2

Whether section 59Immigration Actsis valid

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