The doctrine of witness immunity is absolute in civil cases, preventing claims for perjury or related torts based on evidence provided during judicial proceedings.

Held, allowing the appeals:

(1)(per Zabariah Yusof FCJ, majority) It would defeat the whole purpose of invoking witness immunity, if a witness was to go for full trial first to determine whether immunity applied, as he would have been vexed at the full trial in Suit 460 when defending the claim by the plaintiff. Suit 460 arose from the testimony and acts of witnesses in the course of judicial proceedings. The pleadings failed to disclose that the claim failed outside the bounds of witness immunity. Therefore, witness immunity was to be determined at the striking out application at the pleading stage, before proceeding for full trial (see paras 46–48).

(2)(per Zabariah Yusof FCJ, majority) The immunity afforded to witnesses of facts, was absolute and complete from any form of civil action in respect of evidence given in the course of proceedings. The statement of claim did not show any real claim of fabrication or forgery against all the defendants capable of bringing the case outside of the immunity rule and neither did it fall outside the core immunity. The allegations were general without any particulars or specifics. The plaintiff’s allegations against the defendants focused solely on the evidence provided by them during the proceedings of Suit 1333, and did not fall within the exceptions to the witness immunity rule. The allegations against the defendants came within the ambit of the core immunity, namely it related to the things done or said in the course of court proceedings. As for the things said or done outside court, they were said or done in the course of proceedings which came within the extension to the core immunity. The High Court was correct in determining that D1–D5 was entitled to rely on witness immunity or privilege. Absolute immunity applied to the defendants which coverred statements made in the course of judicial proceedings, even those which were untrue and made maliciously. D1–D5 was immune from any civil action concerning the evidence provided as the witnesses during the trial of Suit 1333, especially given that the plaintiff’s action in the High Court herein was to claim damages against D1–D5. Therefore, the plaintiff’s claim against D1–D5 was clearly unsustainable and should be struck out. The Court of Appeal erred in law and fact by allowing the plaintiff’s appeal and disregarding the application of witness immunity to D1–D5. question 1 was answered in the positive (see paras 80, 100, 104–105 & 110–113).

(3)(per Zabariah Mohd Yusof FCJ, majority) The second claim by the plaintiff against D1 and the other defendants was an abuse of process. The plaintiff had been vindicated or was successful in the first suit could not mount a second action against the same party in the first action based on the conduct and/or evidence of the said opposing party. Being a successful litigant in Suit 1333, the plaintiff could not be said to have been wronged. The plaintiff had been reasonably compensated by the award of interests on the judgment sum awarded to him by the Court of Appeal in Appeal 1694. As such, the plaintiff was precluded from claiming any form of damages stemming from D1’s alleged refusal to pay to the plaintiff the RM8,018,225 due under the purported acknowledgment of debt. Suit 1333 and the present appeal bore similarities in actions and damages sought. Clearly, the subject matter of the case had already been dealt with by the High Court in Suit 1333, the majority decision in the Court of Appeal in Appeal 1694 and on appeal to the Federal Court. To allow Suit 460 to go for